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Abstract
I develop a search-and-bargaining model of endogenous intermediation in over-the-counter
markets. Unlike the existing work, my model allows for rich investor heterogeneity in
three simultaneous dimensions: preferences, inventories, and meeting rates. By compar-
ing trading-volume patterns that arise in my model and are observed in practice, I argue
that the heterogeneity in meeting rates is the main driver of intermediation patterns. I
find that investors with higher meeting rates (i.e., fast investors) are less averse to hold-
ing inventories and more attracted to cash earnings, which makes the model corroborate
a number of stylized facts that do not emerge from existing models: (i) fast investors
provide intermediation by charging a speed premium, and (ii) fast investors hold more
extreme inventories. Then, I use the model to study the effect of trading frictions on the
supply and price of liquidity. On social welfare, I show that the interaction of meeting
rate heterogeneity with optimal inventory management makes the equilibrium inefficient.
In the equilibrium, investors have less dispersed inventories than the socially efficient allo-
cation. I provide a financial transaction tax/subsidy scheme that corrects this inefficiency,
in which fast investors cross-subsidize slow investors.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical analyses of over-the-counter (OTC) markets point to a high level of hetero-
geneity among intermediaries along three interrelated dimensions of market liquidity: frequency
of trades, trade size, and price of intermediation services.1 Some intermediaries, who appear to
be central in the network of trades, trade very frequently and provide liquidity to their coun-
terparties by trading in larger quantities. Moreover, intermediation markups calculated from
transaction prices differ systematically across intermediaries. In the corporate bond market,
for example, central intermediaries earn higher markups compared to peripheral intermedi-
aries.2 On the other hand, central intermediaries in the market for asset-backed securities earn
lower markups.3 In this paper, I provide an endogenous intermediation model that generates
these empirical trading patterns as equilibrium outcome based on ex ante heterogeneity across
investors in the frequency of trade opportunities.
More precisely, I consider an infinite-horizon dynamic model—in the spirit of Duffie, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2005)—in which investors meet in pairs to trade an asset. I go beyond the lit-
erature by considering investors who differ in meeting rates, time-varying hedging needs, and
asset positions. Investors are assumed to have quadratic utility, with marginal utility being
linear in asset position and hedging need. As a result, bilateral trade quantities and prices
become linear in asset position and hedging need, allowing for an analytical characterization
of the steady-state equilibrium, in which the equilibrium objects are available in closed form
up to endogenous degree of inventory aversion that solves a functional equation. Therefore,
one contribution of this paper to the literature is methodological: It shows that, by using a
quadratic utility structure, accommodating unrestricted asset positions and ex ante and ex post
heterogeneity in investor characteristics without forgoing fully decentralized trading is possible.
With this level of generality, my model offers a workhorse framework that allows for further
study of positive and normative issues surrounding OTC markets.
As is typical in search models, intermediation arises endogenously as a result of equilibrium
price dispersion. Not only do investors trade to share risk with other investors, but they also
trade to provide intermediation to others, i.e., to profit from price dispersion. In my model, an
1The heterogeneity among intermediaries is documented for the corporate bond market (Hendershott, Li,
Livdan, and Schu¨rhoff, 2015 and Di Maggio, Kermani, and Song, 2017), the municipal bond market (Li and
Schu¨rhoff, 2018), the fed funds market (Bech and Atalay, 2010), the overnight interbank lending market (Afonso,
Kovner, and Schoar, 2013), the market for asset-backed securities (Hollifield, Neklyudov, and Spatt, 2017), and
the market for credit default swaps (Siriwardane, 2018).
2See Di Maggio et al. (2017).
3See Hollifield et al. (2017).
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investor’s hedging need, asset position, and meeting rate jointly determine her instantaneous
incentive to provide intermediation to others. I show that investors with moderate hedging
needs, moderate asset positions, and high meeting rates endogenously arise as “central inter-
mediaries” as they have the largest intermediation volume. I compare trading-volume patterns
that arise in equilibrium with the empirically documented patterns. In equilibrium, gross trad-
ing volume is highest for investors with extreme hedging need, extreme asset position, and high
meeting rate. Thus, if the hedging need or asset position is the main driver of intermediation
patterns, gross volume must decline with centrality. If the meeting rate is the main driver of
intermediation patterns, gross volume must increase with centrality. In light of the empirical
evidence that gross volume increases with centrality in OTC markets, I argue that the main
underlying heterogeneity that drives the centrality differentials across intermediaries is their
meeting rate.
In the characterization of equilibrium, I show that an investor’s trading behavior can be
summarized by her meeting rate and an endogenous object dependent on her hedging need
type, asset position, and meeting rate. I call this endogenous object “inventory” because it is
equal to the difference between the investor’s current asset position and target asset position.
The main mechanism behind meeting rates affecting systematically investors’ trading behavior
is that a high meeting rate gives an investor comparative advantage in carrying inventory by
leading to a lower endogenous degree of aversion to inventory holding. The inventory aversion
is lower for investors with high meeting rates (i.e., fast investors) because they are able to
transition to a future state faster by rebalancing their holdings. This increases the importance
of the option value of search, and decreases the importance of the current inventory. In other
words, low inventory aversion leads to lower sensitivity of marginal valuation to current inven-
tory. Therefore, fast investors put less weight on their inventories and more weight on their
cash earnings when bargaining with counterparties. Each bilateral negotiation between a slow
and a fast investor results in a trade size more in line with the slow party’s trading need and
a trade price containing a premium benefitting the fast party (which I call speed premium).
Controlling for the inventory level, fast investors provide more intermediation because of this
comparative advantage channel. In addition, fast investors engage in higher offsetting buying
and selling activity due to the higher matching rate with counterparties. However, the compar-
ative advantage channel leads to an increase in the intermediation level above and beyond that
direct effect. As in the data, not only do fast investors trade more often, but they also trade
larger quantities on average in each match.
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In addition to the empirical relationship between centrality and quantity, the model can
rationalize the relationship between centrality and price of intermediation services observed in
OTC markets. I show that bilaterally negotiated prices can be written as the sum of post-trade
marginal valuation and speed pemium. These two components generate opposite effects in
determining the sign of the relationship between centrality and intermediation markups. As
in the empirical studies, let markup refer to the wedge between the price at which an investor
buys and the price at which she resells in an offsetting intermediation trade. As I argue above,
fast investors’ marginal valuations are less sensitive to inventory levels. This stable marginal
valuation effect allows a fast investor to sell at a low marginal cost, and hence, tends to reduce
the markup she earns. If this is the dominant effect, we observe a negative relationship between
centrality and markups. On the other hand, fast investors charge a speed premium above
their marginal cost. This tends to increase the markup fast investors earn. When the speed
premium effect is dominant, we observe a positive relationship between centrality and markups.
I find that the speed premium is dominant in markets with large cross-sectional dispersion of
inventories.
Another important result of my model is that the interaction of unrestricted trade quantities
and investor heterogeneity makes the equilibrium constrained inefficient.4 The root cause of
inefficiency is ex post bargaining, which makes fast investors able to capture a private transac-
tion surplus larger than their contribution to surplus creation. This result reveals that there is
room for beneficial intervention in markets with ex post bargaining and investor heterogeneity,
as in virtually all OTC markets. Turning to policy, I provide an optimal tax/subsidy scheme
on financial transactions that corrects this inefficiency. This scheme requires policymakers to
monitor the changes in investors’ hedging needs and asset positions and give out subsidies or
collect taxes on the transactions they conduct with one another.5 I show that this policy makes
fast investors cross-subsidize slow investors over time as expected because, in the privately
optimal equilibrium, fast investors capture larger surplus than their contribution.
In the last part of the paper, I study how my results differ from the one that would obtain
4For the inefficiency result, the coexistence of unrestricted trade quantities and investor heterogeneity is
essential. Afonso and Lagos (2015) and Farboodi, Jarosch, and Shimer (2015) show, respectively, that if there is
no investor heterogeneity or if trade quantities are restricted to {0, 1}, the negotiated trade quantities coincide
with the planner’s quantities.
5The recently implemented section of the Dodd-Frank Act, often referred to as “the Volcker Rule,” which
disallows proprietary trading by banks and their affiliates, also requires a similar level of monitoring. Some
forms of proprietary trading are exempted from the Volcker Rule, such as those related to market making or
hedging. Thus, regulators must monitor banks’ positions and trading behavior and calculate certain metrics
like transaction frequency or hedging need to determine proprietary trading, unrelated to hedging or market
making. See Duffie (2012) for a discussion.
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in a static network-theoretic model of OTC market. I find that, in both of these environments,
having access to a larger number of counterparties gives an investor advantage in providing
liquidity to others. The advantage in the static network model is being able to unload any
unwanted asset-position portion from a trade to a larger number of counterparties in the cross
section, while the advantage in the dynamic search model is being able to unload any unwanted
asset-position portion from a trade to a larger number of counterparties (in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance) over a fixed period of time. One key difference in these two
approaches, on the other hand, stems from the static vs. dynamic nature of the two models. In
the static network model, there is no concept of option value of continuing search, and hence,
there does not arise a sensitivity differential across investors’ marginal valuations due to the
different number counterparties they have. As a result, the bargaining parties’ contributions
to surplus creation coincide with their privately captured shares of surplus. This means that
investors with larger number counterparties provide liquidity but do so at its marginal cost,
and hence, there does not arise any “connectedness” premium in negotiated prices.
1.1 Related literature
A fast-growing body of literature, spurred by Duffie et al. (2005), has recently applied search-
theoretic methods to asset pricing. The early models in this literature —such as Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2007), Weill (2008), and Vayanos and Weill (2008),6—studied the-
ories of fully decentralized markets in a random search and bilateral bargaining environment
and used these theories to present a better understanding of the individual and aggregate im-
plications of distinctively non-Walrasian features of those markets. These models maintain
tractability by limiting the investors to two asset positions, 0 or 1. Another part of this body of
literature, with papers by Gaˆrleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2007, 2009), eliminates
the {0, 1} restriction on holdings by introducing a partially centralized market structure. In
their framework, investors trade in a centralized market but only infrequently and by paying
an intermediation fee to exogenously designated intermediaries who have continuous access to
the centralized market.7 In these models, the part of trade surplus captured by exogenous
6The framework of Duffie et al. (2005) has also been adopted to analyze a number of issues, such as market
fragmentation (Miao, 2006), liquidity in corporate bond market (He and Milbradt, 2014), the co-existence of
illiquid and liquid markets (Praz, 2014, Chapter I), the liquidity spillover between bond and CDS markets
(Sambalaibat, 2015), the supply of liquid assets (Geromichalos and Herrenbrueck, 2016), and the endogenous
bargaining delays (Tsoy, 2016).
7Other papers that use the same partially centralized market structure include Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill
(2011), Lester, Rocheteau, and Weill (2015), Pagnotta and Philippon (2018), and Randall (2015). Lester et al.
(2015) differs from the other papers by employing ex ante price posting and directed search as the trading
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intermediaries is purely speed premium because intermediaries do not have any contribution
to surpluses. I show that speed premium is a natural equilibrium outcome in a model with
endogenous intermediation.
Recently, there has been a proliferation of endogenous intermediation models. Similarly to
my paper, many of them generalize the random search framework of Duffie et al. (2005), such as
Afonso and Lagos (2015), Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2014), Neklyudov (2014), Shen, Wei,
and Yan (2015), Farboodi et al. (2015), and Farboodi, Jarosch, and Menzio (2016). While these
papers consider only one-dimensional rich heterogeneity, my model features rich heterogeneity
in three simultaneous dimensions and hence uncovers important interactions among different
investor characteristics in jointly determining the intermediation patterns. For instance, the
special case of my model with a homogeneous meeting rate can be considered an extension of
Hugonnier et al. (2014) with risk-averse investors and unrestricted asset holdings. They show
that investors with average exogenous valuations have the highest instantaneous incentive to
provide intermediation. In my setup with unrestricted holdings, investors with the “correct”
amount of assets have the highest incentive to intermediate instead of those with the average
exogenous valuation. In other words, in my setup, intermediaries might be “low valuation-low
holding,” “average valuation-average holding,” or “high valuation-high holding” investors.
The combination of unrestricted holdings and fully decentralized trade is essential for my
analysis because fully decentralized trade is necessary for endogenous intermediation, and unre-
stricted holdings are necessary for studying optimal inventory holding behavior. To my knowl-
edge, there are two papers with this combination. Afonso and Lagos (2015) study trading
dynamics in the fed funds market. In their model, banks are homogeneous in terms of pref-
erences and meeting rates. The basic insight from their model on endogenous intermediation
applies to my model as well. They show that banks with average asset holdings endogenously
become middlemen of the market by buying from banks with excess reserves and selling to
banks with low reserves. Relative to Afonso and Lagos (2015), my contribution is to solve for a
steady-state equilibrium with two new dimensions of heterogeneity: hedging need and meeting
rate. As I explain above, these are important for explaining stylized OTC market facts and
obtaining new policy implications. Chapter III of Praz (2014, co-authored with Julien Cujean)
studies the impact of information asymmetry between counterparties. Although their model
also features unrestricted asset holdings and a fully decentralized market structure, my work
protocol instead of random search and ex post bargaining. Neklyudov and Sambalaibat (2017) also adopt a
directed search approach with segmented interdealer and dealer-customer markets. However, the interdealer
platform is frictional in their model.
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is different from theirs in that they assume all investors have the same meeting rate. In or-
der to analyze the microstructure of OTC markets, I introduce meeting rate heterogeneity but
keep the usual symmetric information assumption of the literature. Then I study the resulting
topology of trading relations.
My model is the first that introduces ex ante heterogeneity in meeting rates into a fully
decentralized market model with unrestricted asset holdings. To the best of my knowledge, in
the literature, there are only two other papers with heterogeneity in meeting rate: Neklyudov
(2014) and Farboodi et al. (2015). Both restrict the asset positions so that they lie in {0, 1}.
Relative to these models, an important additional insight of my model is that fast investors
can differentiate themselves from slow investors by offering more attractive trade quantities to
their counterparties. In this way, they can charge a speed premium, and earn higher markups
depending on the equilibrium dispersion of inventories. In the {0, 1} models, fast investors
typically earn lower markups because of the lower variability of their reservation values.8 On the
normative side, I show that the interaction of unrestricted holdings and investor heterogeneity
makes the equilibrium inefficient.
Alternative approaches to endogenous intermediation include the static matching approach
(Atkeson, Eisfeldt, and Weill, 2015) and the static network approach (Babus and Kondor, 2013;
Malamud and Rostek, 2017; Gofman, 2011; and Farboodi, 2014). I show that some of the key
insights of my model, such as the dependence of target asset positions on the number counter-
parties and the emergence of speed premium in negotiated prices, are dynamic phenomena and
do not arise in static environments. Similarly to my paper, a vast majority of the papers in the
endogenous intermediation literature start with ex ante heterogeneous investors and analyze
how the existing heterogeneity shapes investors’ trading behavior. Farboodi (2014), Farboodi
et al. (2015), and Wang (2016) instead start with ex ante identical investors and show how
investor heterogeneity arises endogenously to leverage the gains from intermediation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
studies the equilibrium of the model, while Section 4 assesses the empirical implications of the
endogenous asset positions in OTC markets given by the equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the
constrained efficient solution and how it can be decentralized. Section 6 makes a comparison
between the search and the network modelling approaches to OTC markets. Section 7 is the
8Providing an alternative theory based on directed search and exogenously stable valuations of central in-
termediaries, Chang and Zhang (2016) also show that markups can be increasing in centrality. Starting with
investors with the same level of stability in exogenous valuations, my model generates endogenously the higher
stability of central intermediaries’ valuations.
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conclusion.
2 Environment
Time is continuous and runs forever. I fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Pr) and a filtration
{Ft, t ≥ 0} of sub-σ-algebras satisfying the usual conditions (see Protter, 2004). There is a
continuum of investors with a total measure normalized to 1 and a long-lived asset in fixed
supply denoted by A ≥ 0. This asset is traded over the counter and pays an expected dividend
flow denoted by κ0. There is also a perishable good, called the nume´raire, which all investors
produce and consume.
2.1 Preferences
I borrow the specification of preferences and trading motives from Duffie et al. (2007). The
investors’ time preference rate is denoted by r. The instantaneous utility function of an investor
is u(ρ, a) + c, where
u(ρ, a) ≡ κ0a− 1
2
κ1a
2 − κ2ρa (1)
is the instantaneous quadratic benefit to the investor from holding a ∈ R units of the asset
when of type ρ ∈ [−1,+1] and c ∈ R denotes the net consumption of the nume´raire good. An
investor’s net consumption becomes negative when she produces the nume´raire to make side
payments.
This utility specification is interpreted in terms of risk aversion.9 Since the parameter
κ0 is an expected rather than actual dividend flow, this cash flow needs to be adjusted for
risk. The second term represents the instantaneous variance of the asset payoff, while the last
term captures the instantaneous covariance between the asset payoff and some background
risk. Therefore, the investor’s type ρ is interpreted as capturing the instantaneous correlation
between the asset payoff and the background risk. Keeping this interpretation in mind, I will
refer to ρ as hedging need type.
Importantly, hedging need is heterogeneous across investors, creating the fundamental gains
from trade. I further assume that each investor’s hedging need type itself is stochastic, in order
for the gains from trade to exist in a stationary equilibrium. Namely, an investor receives
9In Appendix E, I derive this quadratic utility specification from first principles, up to a suitable first-order
approximation. I leave the micro-foundation of this specification to the appendix because the reduced-form
imparts the main intuitions without the burden of derivations. See Duffie et al. (2007), Vayanos and Weill
(2008), and Gaˆrleanu (2009) for a similar derivation.
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idiosyncratic hedging shocks at Poisson arrival times with intensity α > 0. The arrival of these
shocks is independent from other stochastic processes and across investors. For simplicity,
I assume that types are not persistent, and upon the arrival of an idiosyncratic shock, the
investor’s new hedging need type is drawn according to the pdf f on [−1,+1].
2.2 Trade
All trades are fully bilateral. I assume that investors with different trading speed coexist in a
sense that will now be described.
The cross-sectional distribution of investor’s speed type, λ, is given by pdf ψ (λ) on [0,M ].
The parameter λ is distributed independently from the hedging need type ρ in the cross section
and from all the stochastic processes in the model. An investor who is endowed with a speed type
of λ meets another investor with a speed type of λ′ at a Poisson arrival rate of m (λ, λ′)ψ (λ′),
where m (., .) is symmetric, increasing, and linear in both arguments. As a result, an investor
with speed type λ finds a counterparty at total instantaneous rate m (λ,Λ):
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)ψ (λ′) dλ′ = m (λ,Λ) ,
where
Λ ≡
M∫
0
λ′ψ (λ′) dλ′.
The assumptions above accommodate two famous examples of linear search technology,
m (λ, λ′) = λ + λ′ and m (λ, λ′) = 2λλ
′
Λ
, discussed by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), and
Shimer and Smith (2001). Both technologies capture the fact that an investor can initiate
a contact or be contacted by others. The former assumes that, conditional on contact, the
counterparty is chosen randomly and uniformly from the pool of all investors. The latter
assumes that the counterparty is chosen randomly but with likelihood proportional to their
speed type.
Finally, each contact between a pair of investors is followed by a symmetric Nash bar-
gaining game over quantity q and unit price P . Suppose the types of contacting investors
are (ρ, a, λ) and (ρ′, a′, λ′). The number of assets the investor (ρ, a, λ) purchases is denoted by
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]. Thus, she will become an investor of type (ρ, a+q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)
after this trade, while her counterparty will become type (ρ′, a′ − q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ′),
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due to bilateral feasibility. The per unit price the investor (ρ, a, λ) will pay is denoted by
P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)].
3 Equilibrium
In this section, I define a stationary equilibrium for this economy. Then, as a benchmark
case, I solve the Walrasian counterpart of this economy. Finally, I characterize the stationary
decentralized market equilibrium.
3.1 Definition
First, I will define the investors’ value functions, taking as given the equilibrium joint distri-
bution, Φ(ρ, a, λ), of hedging need types, asset positions, and speed types. Then I will write
down the conditions that the equilibrium distribution satisfies.
3.1.1 Investors
Let J(ρ, a, λ) be the maximum attainable utility of an investor of type (ρ, a, λ). In steady state,
an application of Bellman’s principle of optimality implies (see Appendix A)
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = u(ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {J(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)
−q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′), (2)
where
{q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]}
= arg max
q,P
[J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)− Pq] 12 [J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′) + Pq] 12 , (3)
s.t.
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)− Pq ≥ 0,
J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′) + Pq ≥ 0.
The first term on the RHS of Equation (2) is the investor’s utility flow; the second term is the
expected change in the investor’s continuation utility, conditional on switching hedging need
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types, which occurs with Poisson intensity α; and the third term is the expected change in
the continuation utility, conditional on trade, which occurs with Poisson intensity m (λ,Λ) =
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)ψ (λ′) dλ′. The potential counterparty is drawn randomly from the population, with
the likelihood, m(λ,λ
′)
m(λ,Λ)
, that depends on her speed type λ′. Terms of trade, q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]
and P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], maximize the symmetric Nash product (3) subject to the usual
individual rationality constraints.
3.1.2 Market clearing and the distribution of investor types
Let Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) denote the joint cumulative distribution of hedging needs, asset positions, and
speed types in the stationary equilibrium. Since Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) is a joint cdf, it should satisfy
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
Φ(dρ∗, da∗, dλ∗) = 1. (4)
The clearing of the market for the asset requires that
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
a∗Φ(dρ∗, da∗, dλ∗) = A. (5)
Since the heterogeneity in speed types is ex ante, I impose
λ∗∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
Φ(dρ, da, dλ) =
λ∗∫
0
ψ (λ) dλ (6)
for all λ∗ ∈ [0,M ] to ensure that the equilibrium distribution is consistent with the cross-
sectional distribution of λs. I also impose
λ∗∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
aΦ(dρ, da, dλ) ≥ 0 (7)
for all λ∗ ∈ [0,M ]. This can be understood as a within-speed-class aggregate short-sale con-
straint; i.e., asset positions are unrestricted for individual investors, but once aggregated across
investors with the same speed type, it must be non-negative. This is essentially a technical
constraint used in establishing the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
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Finally, the conditions for stationarity are
− αΦ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗)(1− F (ρ∗)) + α
λ∗∫
0
a∗∫
−∞
1∫
ρ∗
Φ(dρ, da, dλ)F (ρ∗)
−
λ∗∫
0
a∗∫
−∞
ρ∗∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) I{q[(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]>a∗−a}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)
Φ(dρ, da, dλ)
+
λ∗∫
0
∞∫
a∗
ρ∗∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) I{q[(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]≤a∗−a}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)
Φ(dρ, da, dλ) = 0 (8)
for all (ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) ∈ [−1, 1]× R× [0,M ], where
F (ρ∗) ≡
ρ∗∫
−1
f (ρ) dρ.
The first term of the first line is the outflow from idiosyncratic shocks. Investors who
belong to Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) receive hedging shocks at rate α and leave Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) with probability
1−F (ρ∗), i.e., if their new type is higher than ρ∗. Similarly, the second term of the first line is
the inflow from idiosyncratic shocks. Investors who do not belong to Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) but have an
asset holding less than a∗ and a speed type less than λ∗ receive hedging shocks at rate α and
enter Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) with probability F (ρ∗), i.e., if their new type is less than ρ∗.
The second line represents the outflow from trade. Conditional on a contact, investors who
belong to Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) leave Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) if they buy a sufficiently high number of assets, i.e., if
they buy at least a∗−a units, where a is the number of assets before trade. Similarly, the third
line represents the inflow from trade. Investors who do not belong to Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) but have a
hedging need type less than ρ∗ and a speed type less than λ∗ enter Φ(ρ∗, a∗, λ∗) if they sell a
sufficiently high number of assets, i.e., if they sell at least a− a∗ units, where a is the number
of assets before trade. Note that selling at least a − a∗ units is equivalent to buying at most
a∗ − a units, and hence, I write q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] ≤ a∗ − a inside the indicator function.
A stationary equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1. A stationary equilibrium is (i) a pricing function P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], (ii) a
trade size function q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], (iii) a function J(ρ, a, λ) for continuation utilities,
and (iv) a joint distribution Φ(ρ, a, λ) of hedging need types, asset positions, and speed types,
such that
• Steady state: Given (ii), (iv) solves the system (4)-(8).
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• Optimality: Given (i), (ii), and (iv), (iii) solves the investor’s problem (2) subject to (3).
• Nash bargaining: Given (iii), (i) and (ii) satisfy (3).
3.2 The Walrasian benchmark
I solve the stationary equilibrium of a continuous frictionless Walrasian market as a benchmark.
Then I use the outcome of this benchmark to better understand the effect of trading frictions
on market outcomes. As is typical in models with continuous access to a trading venue but
infrequent need to trade, I start by decomposing the state space into inaction and action
regions. In the inaction region, an investor enjoys the flow utility from holding the asset. In the
action region, she immediately accesses the Walrasian market and rebalances her asset position
to end up in the inaction region.
The flow Bellman equation of investors in the inaction region can be written as the following
integral equation:
u (ρ, a)− rJW (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
[
JW (ρ′, a)− JW (ρ, a)] f(ρ′)dρ′ = 0. (9)
The first term is the investor’s utility flow. The second term is the time discount. The last term
is the expected change in the investor’s continuation utility, conditional on switching hedging
need types, which occurs with Poisson intensity α.
In the action region, the value function satisfies the condition
JW (ρ, a) = max
a
{
JW (ρ, a)− PW (a− a)} , (10)
which basically states that it is indeed optimal for the investor to access the market, costing her
PW (a− a) units of the nume´raire, where PW is the market-clearing price. In addition, I need
to make sure that staying at a given asset position level in the action region for an infinitesimal
amount of time results in a marginal utility loss. Combining with (9), this means that JW (ρ, a)
must satisfy the following variational inequality:
u (ρ, a)− rJW (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
[
JW (ρ′, a)− JW (ρ, a)] f(ρ′)dρ′ ≤ 0.
Collecting together, the flow Bellman equation of investors can be written as an impulse control
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problem:
max {u (ρ, a)− rJW (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
[
JW (ρ′, a)− JW (ρ, a)] f(ρ′)dρ′,
JW (ρ, a)− (JW (ρ, a)− PW (a− a))} = 0,
where
a = argmax
a
{
JW (ρ, a)− PW (a− a)} .
Thanks to the absence of frictions, I conjecture (and later verify) that, given PW , the
inaction region is a measure-zero point
[
ρ, a∗(ρ;PW )
]
for investors with hedging need type ρ,
where a∗(.;PW ) is a strictly monotone function. Under this conjecture, one can use (10) to
substitute out JW (ρ′, a) in (9):
rJW (ρ, a) = u (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
max
a′
{
JW (ρ′, a′)− JW (ρ, a)− PW (a′ − a)} f(ρ′)dρ′.
The FOC for the asset position and the envelope condition10 are
JW2 (ρ
′, a′) = PW
and
rJW2 (ρ, a) = u2 (ρ, a) + α
(−JW2 (ρ, a) + PW ) ,
where u2 (., .) represents the partial derivative with respect to the second argument. Combining
these two conditions, I get the optimal demand of the investor with ρ, which places her in the
inaction region:
a∗(ρ;PW ) =
r
κ1
(κ0
r
− PW
)
− κ2
κ1
ρ.
The market-clearing condition
1∫
−1
a∗(ρ;PW )f(ρ)dρ = A
10To write down these conditions, I assume that JW (ρ, .) is strictly concave and continuously differentiable.
This assumption is also verified ex post.
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implies that the equilibrium objects are
aW (ρ) = A− κ2
κ1
(ρ− ρ) (11)
for all ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and
PW =
u2 (ρ,A)
r
=
κ0
r
− κ1
r
A− κ2
r
ρ,
where
ρ ≡
1∫
−1
ρ′f (ρ′) dρ′.
The implication of the equilibrium is intuitive: The equilibrium holding is a decreasing
function of ρ. As ρ increases, the hedging benefit of the asset decreases, and investors hold
less of it. The investor with the average hedging need type holds the per capita supply. The
coefficient of the current hedging need in the optimal holding is κ2
κ1
. The coefficient κ2 of the
background risk in the utility function has a positive impact on the dispersion of investors’
holdings because they have a higher incentive to hold or avoid the asset when their background
is more volatile. On the other hand, the coefficient κ1 of the asset position in the utility function
has a negative impact on the dispersion of investors’ holdings because the importance of the
cost of risk-bearing relative to the hedging demand rises when κ1 is larger. Thus, investors’
positions become closer to one another as required by efficient risk sharing.
The instantaneous trading volume in the Walrasian market is
VW = α
1∫
−1
1∫
−1
∣∣aW (ρ′)− aW (ρ)∣∣ f (ρ) f (ρ′) dρdρ′ = ακ2
κ1
1∫
−1
1∫
−1
|ρ′ − ρ| f (ρ) f (ρ′) dρdρ′.
This is basically the multiplication of the flow of investors who receive idiosyncratic shock, α,
and the change in the optimal holding of those investors. When I characterize the OTC market
equilibrium, I will show that the Walrasian market outcomes differ markedly from the OTC
outcomes. As a preview, in the Walrasian equilibrium, (i) there is no price dispersion, (ii) no
one provides intermediation (apart from the Walrasian auctioneer), and, therefore, (iii) net and
gross trade volume coincide.
Finally, I calculate the sum of all investors’ continuation utilities as a measure of welfare,
following Gaˆrleanu (2009):
WW =
κ0
r
A− κ1
2r
A2 − κ2
r
ρA+
κ22
2rκ1
var [ρ] .
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The last term of the welfare exclusively captures the hedging benefit from being able to access
the centralized market instantly following an idiosyncratic shock. The OTC market frictions
will affect the welfare through this term.
3.3 Characterization
3.3.1 Individual trades
Terms of individual trades, q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] and P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], are determined by
the symmetric Nash bargaining protocol with the solution given by the optimization problem
(3). I guess and verify that J(ρ, ., λ) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave for all
ρ and λ. This allows me to set up the Lagrangian of this problem and find the first-order
necessary and sufficient conditions (see Theorem M.K.2., p. 959, and Theorem M.K.3., p. 961,
in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995) for optimality by differentiating the Lagrangian.
The trade size, q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], solves
J2(ρ, a+ q, λ) = J2(ρ
′, a′ − q, λ′), (12)
where J2 represents the partial derivative with respect to the second argument. The continuous
differentiability and strict concavity of J(ρ, ., λ) guarantees the existence and uniqueness of the
trade quantity q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]. Notice that the quantity that solves Equation (12) is also
the maximizer of the total trade surplus, i.e.,
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] = arg max
q
J(ρ, a+q, λ)−J(ρ, a, λ)+J(ρ′, a′−q, λ′)−J(ρ′, a′, λ′). (13)
Then, the transaction price, P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], is determined such that the total trade
surplus is split equally between the parties:
P =
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)− (J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′))
2q
(14)
if J2(ρ, a, λ) 6= J2(ρ′, a′, λ′); and P = J2(ρ, a, λ) if J2(ρ, a, λ) = J2(ρ′, a′, λ′). Substituting (13)
and (14) into (2), I get the following auxiliary Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = u (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
2
[
max
q
{J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)
+J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′)}] Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′). (15)
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In order to solve for J(ρ, a, λ), I follow a guess-and-verify approach. The complete solution
is given in the appendix. In the models with {0, 1} holding, the investors’ trading behavior is
determined by their reservation value, which is the difference between the value of holding the
asset and that of not holding the asset. The counterpart of the reservation value in my model
with unrestricted holdings is the marginal continuation utility —or the marginal valuation, in
short. To find the marginal valuation, I differentiate Equation (15) with respect to a, applying
the envelope theorem:
rJ2(ρ, a, λ) = u2 (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
[J2(ρ
′, a, λ)− J2(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′) {J2(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− J2(ρ, a, λ)}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′),
(16)
where
u2(ρ, a) = κ0 − κ1a− κ2ρ.
Since the utility function is quadratic, the marginal utility flow is linear. Equation (16) is
basically a flow Bellman equation that has a linear return function with a slope coefficient inde-
pendent of ρ. Therefore, the solution J2(ρ, a, λ) is linear in a if and only if q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)]
is linear in a. Conjecturing that q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] is linear in a and that the slope coefficient
of a in the marginal valuation is − κ1
r˜(λ)
for r˜ (λ) > 0,11 the FOC (12) implies that
J2(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)] , λ) =
r˜ (λ) J2(ρ, a, λ) + r˜ (λ
′) J2(ρ′, a′, λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
, (17)
i.e., the post-trade marginal valuation of both investors is equal to the weighted average of their
initial marginal valuations, with the weights being the reciprocal of the slope coefficient of a in
the marginal valuation. Note that the post-trade marginal valuation will equal the midpoint of
the investors’ initial marginal valuations if they are endowed with the same speed type.
In principle, solving a fully bilateral trade model with unrestricted holdings is a difficult task
because optimal trading rules and the equilibrium asset holding distribution must be pinned
down simultaneously. Indeed, the trading rules depend, in part, on the option value of searching
11These conjectures are verified in the proof of Theorem 1. Here, r˜ (λ) is an important endogenous coefficient
that determines the sensitivity of an investor’s marginal valuation to his current asset position; i.e., it effectively
determines the cost of inventory holding. Since this coefficient depends on the speed type, λ, investors will differ
from one another in the cross section in terms of their effective aversion to inventory holding.
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for a counterparty drawn at random according to the equilibrium asset holding distribution.
The distribution, in turn, must be generated by the optimal trading rules. This creates a
complex fixed-point problem. So far, the literature has side-stepped this complexity by con-
sidering models with trading rules that can be characterized before solving for the endogenous
distribution.12 This is not the case in my model. As can be seen from (12), (16), and (17),
calculating the trading rules requires using the entire equilibrium distribution. However, the
problem becomes relatively easy because (i) marginal utility is linear and additively separable
in hedging need type and asset position and (ii) the distribution of hedging need types and the
distribution of speed types are independent. Thanks to these assumptions, the calculation of
the marginal valuation and trading rules requires using only the first moment of the equilibrium
asset holding distribution conditional on speed type. As a result, the core fixed-point problem
is reduced to two linear functional equations connecting the average asset holding conditional
on λ and the average marginal valuation conditional on λ. Combined with the market clear-
ing, I show that the unique solution of this fixed-point problem implies that the average asset
holding conditional on λ is the supply A, which is independent of λ; i.e., the primary effect of
heterogeneity in λ will be on the variance and the higher-order moments of the distribution.
This allows me to obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The economy studied has a unique stationary equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
investors’ marginal valuations satisfy
J2 (ρ, a, λ) =
1
r
u2
(
rρ+ (α + r˜ (λ)− r) ρ
α + r˜ (λ)
,
ra+ (r˜ (λ)− r)A
r˜ (λ)
)
, (18)
where
r˜ (λ)− r =
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′. (19)
And the average marginal valuation of the market is
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
J2 (ρ, a, λ) Φ (dρ, da, dλ) =
u2(ρ,A)
r
.
12Existing papers do this either by eliminating heterogeneity in investors’ exogenous characteristics (Afonso
and Lagos, 2015) or by employing the {0, 1} restriction on asset positions (Hugonnier et al., 2014 and Farboodi
et al., 2015, for example). In the former, because their exogenous characteristics are identical, investors find
it optimal to trade in a way that they move to the midpoint of their initial asset positions, regardless of the
endogenous asset holding distribution. In the latter, it is shown that whenever there is gains from trade in
a meeting, an indivisible unit of the asset changes hands, and the comparison of the investors’ exogenous
characteristics solely determines whether a gains from trade exists; i.e. it is independent of the endogenous
asset holding distribution.
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Equation (18) shows that the investors’ marginal valuation inherits linearity and additive
separability of the marginal utility flow, where a weighted sum of the investor’s current hedging
need and the average hedging need of the market and a weighted sum of the investor’s current
asset position and the average asset position of the market enter as linear arguments. The
relative weights of the current and the average characteristics depend on the discount rate (r),
the intensity of idiosyncratic shocks (α), and an endogenous object (r˜ (λ)− r) that depends on
speed type, λ.13 In this characterization, r˜ (λ)− r has the role of capturing how intensely the
expected asset position, A, or the expected hedging need, ρ, of an investor’s counterperty in
the next trade opportunity contributes to her marginal valuation. As r˜ (λ)− r gets larger, the
average market conditions becomes a more important determinant of the investor’s marginal
valuation, and her current characteristics, ρ and a, become less important.
The functional equation (19) shows two key properties of r˜ (λ): being increasing and concave.
On the one hand, the speed type, λ, has a direct linear positive impact on r˜ (λ) throughm (λ, λ′).
If an investor is able to find counterparties very often, her marginal valuation must reflect more
the average market conditions compared to the marginal valuation of another investor with a
smaller speed type. This makes the function r˜ (λ) an increasing function. On the other hand,
Equation (17) shows that the post-trade marginal valuation is closer to the initial marginal
valuation of the party with higher r˜ (λ). As a result, a high speed type dampens the effect of
the average market conditions on marginal valuation, and thus an indirect negative impact of
λ on the function r˜ (λ) arises through r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′) . Consequently, the function r˜ (λ) turns out to
be an increasing but concave function of λ.
Lemma 1. The function r˜ (λ), which is consistent with the optimality of the investors’ prob-
lem, exists, is unique, continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave, and
satisfies
M∫
0
r˜ (λ)ψ(λ)dλ = r +
m (Λ,Λ)
4
,
13The functional equation (19) that pins down r˜ (λ) − r is very parsimonious and depends only on discount
rate, matching function, and the distribution of speed types. This is due to (i) separability of marginal utility in
asset position and (ii) the fact that the only ex ante heterogeneity across investors is in trading speed. Thanks
to (i), the distribution of hedging need types does not enter (19). Thanks to (ii), parameters of the investor’s
common utility function do not enter (19). In Appendix G, I solve for an extension with heterogeneity in risk
aversion in addition to trading speed. I show that a generalized version of (19) obtains featuring the joint
distribution of risk aversion and trading speed.
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where
Λ ≡
M∫
0
λ′ψ(λ′)dλ′.
Although the function r˜ (λ) is not available in closed form, most of the important qualitative
implications of heterogeneity in speed types come from the properties stated in Lemma 1 —in
particular, from the fact that r˜ (λ) is an increasing function of λ. An important implication of
this, combined with (18), is that the marginal valuation of investors with very high λ is close
to the average marginal valuation of the market. Therefore, these fast investors become the
natural counterparty for investors with high marginal valuations and those with low marginal
valuations. They buy the assets from investors with low marginal valuations and sell to investors
with high marginal valuations and thus become endogenous “middlemen.”
Let me turn our attention to the determination of negotiated prices. Again, using the fact
that J(ρ, a, λ) is quadratic in a, an exact second-order Taylor expansion shows that:
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ) = J2(ρ, a+ q, λ)q + κ1
2r˜ (λ)
q2.
Next, Equation (14) implies
P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] =J2(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)
+
1
4
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]
(
κ1
r˜ (λ)
− κ1
r˜ (λ′)
)
; (20)
i.e., the transaction price is given by the post-trade marginal valuation plus an adjustment
term. I call the adjustment term the “speed premium” because it always benefits the investor
who is able to find counterparties faster. Note that the transaction price will equal the post-
trade marginal valuation if the trading parties have the same speed. This formula for the price
will provide the main mechanism behind the relation between λ and intermediation markups
defined using the price difference between the two legs of a round-trip transaction in Subsection
4.3. Due to the first term, investors with high λ tend to earn lower markups since they have
stable marginal valuations that do not fluctuate much in response to changes in asset position
and hedging need. On the other hand, they earn a premium increasing in trade size.
An advantage of this setup is that the speed premium of (20) is a sophistication premium,
which arises solely due to the differences in speed types. In reality, the sophistication of fast
investors might come with higher bargaining power as well, which might give rise to additional
premia in prices. However, I show that a sophistication premium arises even without bargaining-
power asymmetry. The next proposition shows analytically how terms of trade depend on
investors’ current state.
20
Proposition 2. Let
θ(ρ, a, λ) = a− A+ κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
(ρ− ρ) (21)
denote the “inventory” of the investor with (ρ, a, λ). In equilibrium, investors’ marginal valua-
tions, individual trade sizes, and transaction prices are given by:
J2(ρ, a, λ) =
u2(ρ,A)
r
− κ1
r˜ (λ)
θ(ρ, a, λ), (22)
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] =
− κ1
r˜(λ)
θ(ρ, a, λ) + κ1
r˜(λ′)θ(ρ
′, a′, λ′)
κ1
r˜(λ)
+ κ1
r˜(λ′)
, (23)
and
P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] =
u2(ρ,A)
r
− κ1
3r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
4r˜(λ)
θ(ρ, a, λ) + r˜(λ)+3r˜(λ
′)
4r˜(λ′) θ(ρ
′, a′, λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
=
u2(ρ,A)
r
− κ1 θ(ρ, a, λ) + θ(ρ
′, a′, λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
post-trade marginal valuation
+
1
4
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]
(
κ1
r˜ (λ)
− κ1
r˜ (λ′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
speed premium
. (24)
If there were no heterogeneity in ρ or in λ, the quantity traded in a bilateral meeting
would depend only on pre-trade asset positions as in Afonso and Lagos (2015). In this sense,
my model generalizes the trading rule of Afonso and Lagos (2015) by showing that, in my
more general model, it depends also on preference parameters (r, κ1, κ2, and α) and search
efficiency parameters (λ and λ′).14 This effect of the preference parameters on trading rules is
a key channel through which changes in the OTC market frictions affect trading volume, price
dispersion, and welfare, as I will show in Section 4 when I discuss the empirical implications of
the model.
The composite type θ of Proposition 2 is called inventory because it is equal to the difference
between the investor’s current asset position and the target asset position:
θ(ρ, a, λ) = a− a∗(ρ, λ),
where the target asset position
a∗(ρ, λ) = A− κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
(ρ− ρ) (25)
14To be more precise, my model can be viewed as nesting a steady-state version of Afonso and Lagos (2015)
with quadratic utility. Although it does not nest the general version of Afonso and Lagos (2015) with general
concave utility, it helps us understand why their trading rules are independent of preference and market friction
parameters.
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solves
J2(ρ, a
∗, λ) =
u2(ρ,A)
r
;
i.e., a∗(ρ, λ) equates the investor’s marginal valuation to the average marginal valuation of the
market. If the inventory is 0, the investor’s marginal valuation is equal to the average marginal
valuation of the market. If the investor has a positive inventory, she is a natural seller because
she has a lower-than-average marginal valuation. If she has a negative inventory, she is a natural
buyer because she has a higher-than-average marginal valuation. Thus, θ is also a sufficient
statistic for the effect of an investor’s current state on her ideal trading behavior in the presence
of frictions.
In this characterization, κ1/r˜ (λ) can be interpreted as the endogenous degree of aversion to
inventory holding, since it captures how much the marginal valuation decreases in response to
holding an additional unit of inventory, as seen in (22).15 Since r˜ (λ) is an increasing function,
inventory aversion is a decreasing function of speed type. This reveals the key channel through
which the speed type differentials across investors affect their trading behavior systematically.
Having a higher λ increases the importance of the option value of search and decreases the
importance of the current utility flow from holding the asset. Controlling for the inventory
level, a slow investor is more desperate to sell/buy, which gives the advantage to fast investors
in holding unwanted positions. This situation manifests itself as a comparative advantage,
because an increase in the trading speed of one of the bargaining parties benefits both of them
when they negotiate on mutually agreeable terms.
More specifically, in a bilateral match between investors (ρ, a, λ) and (ρ′, a′, λ′), ideally,
the first party would want to buy −θ(ρ, a, λ) units, and the second party would want to sell
θ(ρ′, a′, λ′) units of the asset. Thus, the realized trade quantity (23) is a linear combination of
the parties’ ideal trade quantities, with weights being proportional to their inventory aversion.
This is an important result because of its implications for the supply of liquidity services.
Because the inventory aversion, κ1/r˜ (λ), is a decreasing function, Equation (23) reveals that
the trade quantity reflects the the slower party’s trading need to a greater extent. In this
sense, fast investors provide immediacy by trading according to their counterparties’ needs.
15It is important to note that all investors have the same utility function, and the exogenous parameter
κ1 that contributes to their inventory aversion is common for all of them. Thus, the heterogeneity in their
endogenous inventory aversion arises only due to heterogeneity in their trading speed. In Appendix G, I solve
a version of this model with ex ante heterogeneity in risk aversion parameter as well as in trading speed. I
obtain a generalized version of (19) to determine endogenous inventory aversion. I show that upward-sloping
iso-inventory-aversion curves arise on the plane of risk aversion and trading speed because risk aversion and
trading speed have an opposite impact on the investor’s inventory aversion.
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For an investor with a very high λ, the weight of her ideal trade quantity in the bilateral
trade quantity is very small —and so is the disturbance her hedging need creates for her
counterparty. Her counterparty is able to buy from or sell to her in almost exactly the ideal
amount. This asymmetry in how the trade quantity reflects the counterparties’ trading needs
results in a speed premium in the price. Having high λ reduces the endogenous inventory
aversion. Therefore, fast investors put less weight on their inventories and more weight on
their cash earnings when bargaining with a counterparty. Each bilateral negotiation results
in a trade size that is more in line with the slower counterparty’s trading need and a trade
price that contains a premium benefitting the faster counterparty. An investor can achieve the
average marginal valuation by trading with the right counterparty (or the right sequence of
counterparties). The key observation here is that if she trades with a fast counterparty, she
will achieve the average marginal valuation relatively quickly. The trade-off an investor faces is
between the fast correction of the asset position and paying a low price. That is how the speed
premium arises optimally.
Although the analytical results of Proposition 2 rely on the quadratic utility specification,
the comparative advantage channel resulting from trading speed differentials, and its implication
about the asymmetries that arise in the determination of bilateral trade quantities and prices
are new insights that would carry over to this class of models more generally (e.g., to models
that do not assume quadratic utility).
3.3.2 The joint distribution of hedging need types, inventories, and speed types
Since I have an explicit expression for trade sizes, I can eliminate indicator functions in Equation
(8). Writing the system of steady-state equations in terms of conditional pdfs φρ,λ(a), I derive
a system of steady-state equations for conditional pdfs of asset positions. In turn, I apply a
change of variable using the inventory definition of Proposition 2 and arrive at the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. In any stationary equilibrium, the conditional pdf gρ,λ(θ) of inventories must satisfy
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the system
(α +m (λ,Λ)) gρ,λ (θ) = α
1∫
−1
gρ′,λ (θ + (ρ
′ − ρ)C (λ)) f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
gρ,λ (θ
′)
gρ′,λ′
(
θ
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− θ′
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dρ′dλ′, (26)
for all (ρ, θ, λ) ∈ [−1, 1]× R× [0,M ];
∞∫
−∞
gρ,λ (θ) dθ = 1 (27)
for all λ ∈ [0,M ] and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]; and
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
θgρ,λ (θ) f (ρ)ψ (λ) dθdρdλ = 0, (28)
where
C (λ) ≡ κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
.
Equation (27) implies that gρ,λ (θ) is a pdf. Equation (28) is the market-clearing condition
applied to the inventory definition of Proposition 2. Equation (26) has the usual steady-state
interpretation. The LHS represents the outflow from idiosyncratic shocks and trade. The
terms on the RHS represent the inflow from idiosyncratic shocks and the inflow from trade,
respectively. The last term is an “adjusted” convolution (i.e., a convolution after an appropriate
change of variable) since any investor of type (ρ, θ′, λ) can become one of type (ρ, θ, λ) if she
meets the right counterparty. The right counterparty in this context means an investor of
type (ρ′, θ
(
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
− θ′, λ′). Proposition 2 immediately implies that the post-trade type
of the first investor will be (ρ, θ, λ), and hence, she will create inflow. Since the convolution
term complicates the computation of the distribution function, I will make use of the Fourier
transform.16 I follow the definition of Bracewell (2000) for the Fourier transform:
ĥ(z) =
∞∫
−∞
e−i2pixzh (x) dx,
16Following Duffie and Manso (2007); Duffie, Malamud, and Manso (2009, 2014), Duffie, Giroux, and Manso
(2010), Andrei (2013), Praz (2014, Chapter III), and Andrei and Cujean (2017) also made use of convolution
for distributions in the context of search and matching models.
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where ĥ(.) is the Fourier transform of the function h (.).
Let ĝρ,λ(.) be the Fourier transform of the equilibrium conditional pdf gρ,λ(.). Then the
Fourier transform of Equations (26)-(28) are, respectively,
0 = − (α +m (λ,Λ)) ĝρ,λ (z) + α
1∫
−1
e−i2pi(ρ−ρ
′)C(λ)zĝρ′,λ (z) f (ρ
′) dρ′ (29)
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) ĝρ,λ
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′
for all λ ∈ [0,M ], ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and for all z ∈ R;
ĝρ,λ(0) = 1 (30)
for all λ ∈ [0,M ] and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]; and
M∫
0
1∫
−1
ĝ′ρ,λ(0)f (ρ)ψ (λ) dρdλ = 0. (31)
The system (29)-(31) cannot be solved in closed form. However, it facilitates the calculation
of the moments which are derivatives of the transform, with respect to z, at z = 0. Thus, the
system allows me to derive a recursive characterization of the moments of the equilibrium
conditional distribution.
Proposition 3. The following system characterizes uniquely all moments of the equilibrium
conditional distribution of inventories:α +m (λ,Λ)− M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
ψ (λ′) dλ′
Eg [θn | ρ, λ]
= α
n∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
(C (λ))j
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
ρj−kEg
[
(−ρ)kθn−j | λ]
+
n−1∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
Eg
[
θj | ρ, λ] M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
Eg
[
θn−j | λ′]ψ (λ′) dλ′ (32)
for all λ ∈ [0,M ], ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and for all n ∈ Z+; and
Eg [θ | λ] = 0
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for all λ ∈ [0,M ]; where
C (λ) ≡ κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
.
I use this characterization in Section 4 to analyze various dimensions of market liquidity, such
as trading volume, dispersion of marginal valuations and inventories, intermediation markups,
and welfare. One immediate result that can be derived using Proposition 2 and Proposition 3
is the cross-sectional average asset positions, trade sizes, and prices of investors of type (ρ, λ).
These results are summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 4. The average asset holdings, trade sizes, and prices of investors of type (ρ, λ) are
given by:
Eφ [a | ρ, λ] = α
α + 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)A+
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
α + 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
[
A− κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
(ρ− ρ)
]
, (33)
Eφ [q | ρ, λ] = α
α + 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
[
−2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
(ρ− ρ)
]
, (34)
Eφ [P | ρ, λ] = PW − α
α + 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
[
(ρ− ρ) κ2
r˜ (λ) + α
(
3
4
− r˜ (λ)− r
m (λ,Λ)
)]
. (35)
The implication of (33) is intuitive: The average asset position is a decreasing function of
ρ. As ρ increases, the hedging benefit of the asset decreases, and investors hold less of it. The
investor with average hedging need holds the per capita supply on average. It is instructive to
compare (33) with the Walrasian position (11) in order to understand the distortions that OTC
market frictions create on the extensive margin and on the intensive margin. First, note that
if there were not any distortion on the extensive margin, all investors of type (ρ, λ) would hold
the target OTC position (25). However, (33) is a weighted average of the target OTC position
and the per capita supply A. In equilibrium, we observe investors who have recently become
of type (ρ, λ) but have not had the chance to interact with other investors. On average, these
investors hold A, due to the i.i.d. and non-persistence of hedging need shocks. The remaining
investors (i.e., those who have had the chance to interact with another investor after becoming
of type (ρ, λ)) hold the target OTC position on average.17 As a result, the fraction α
α+2(r˜(λ)−r)
can be broadly considered a measure of the distortion on the extensive margin. When r˜ (λ) is
17When the equilibrium asset position density of investors of type (ρ, λ) is numerically calculated, this result
manifests itself with a bimodal density structure. However, this bimodal structure of the density functions is a
result I can only verify numerically. The characterization of the equilibrium distribution in Proposition 3 allows
for the calculation of moments but not density functions. Due to this technical difficulty, the equilibrium asset
position densities can be calculated numerically only.
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finite, this fraction is bigger than 0, and this creates the first source of the deviation from the
Walrasian position.
A second deviation of (33) from the Walrasian position is caused by the distortion on the
intensive margin, i.e., even the target OTC position (25) is different from the Walrasian position
(11). The coefficient of current hedging need in the target OTC position is κ2
κ1
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+α
instead
of κ2
κ1
. Investors put less weight on their current hedging need by scaling down the Walrasian
weight as previously shown by the partially centralized models of Gaˆrleanu (2009) and Lagos
and Rocheteau (2009). This is because investors want to hedge against the risk of being stuck
with undesirable positions for long periods upon the arrival of an idiosyncratic shock. They
achieve this specific hedging by distorting their decisions on the intensive margin. Hence,
investors’ average asset positions are less extreme than the Walrasian position because of the
intensive and extensive margin effects. This analysis also implies that fast investors hold more
extreme positions (exhibiting larger deviation from A) than slow investors on average for two
reasons. First, since they are able to trade often, their target OTC positions are more extreme.
Second, they are exposed to lower distortion on the extensive margin so that their positions are
relatively closer to their target.
From Equation (34), we see that the average signed trade size is a decreasing function of ρ.
The investor with average hedging need has 0 net volume on average. Investors with higher ρs
are net sellers, and investors with lower ρs are net buyers on average. Average individual trade
sizes are also less extreme compared to Walrasian individual trade sizes since investors trade
less aggressively by putting lower weight on their current hedging need.
Equation (35) reveals that the average price is a decreasing function of ρ.18 The investor with
average hedging need ρ faces the Walrasian price on average. Investors with ρ > ρ face lower
prices than the Walrasian price, and investors with ρ < ρ face higher prices than the Walrasian
price. Expected sellers trade at lower prices, and expected buyers trade at higher prices because
their need to buy or sell is reflected in the transaction price through the bargaining process. In
other words, investors with a stronger need to trade —i.e., with high |ρ|—trade at less favorable
terms. This implication is consistent with empirical evidence in Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) in
the fed funds market.
To sum up, in my model, liquidity is priced at the investor pair level but not at the aggre-
gate level. Investors’ average asset positions are less extreme as they put less weight on their
18This is because r˜(λ)−rm(λ,Λ) is smaller than
1
2 , which follows directly from (19) using the fact that r˜ (λ) is
positive-valued.
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current valuation and more weight on their future expected valuation for the asset, compared
to the frictionless case. In other words, net suppliers of the asset supply less than the Wal-
rasian market, and net demanders of the asset demand less. However, the overall effect on the
aggregate demand is zero, and the mean of the equilibrium price distribution is equal to the
Walrasian price.19 Therefore, my model complements the results of the existing purely decen-
tralized markets model by showing that, once portfolio restrictions are eliminated, the pricing
impact of search frictions is low. This result is consistent with the findings of illiquid market
models such as Gaˆrleanu (2009) and transaction cost models such as Constantinides (1986).
These papers show that infrequent trading and high transaction costs have a first-order effect
on investors’ asset positions but only a second-order effect on prices because of the investors’
ability to adjust their asset positions. My model demonstrates that a similar intuition carries
over to decentralized markets when there are no restrictions on holdings.
3.4 Discussion
Before turning to assessing the model’s implications, let me briefly discuss some of the assump-
tions of the model. To begin with, the reduced-form utility function adopted in this paper,
which is linear in consumption and concave in asset position, can be viewed as arising from a
source-dependent preference specification, in the spirit of Skiadas (2008) and Hugonnier, Pel-
grin, and St-Amour (2013). In particular, in Appendix E, I show that this functional form
arises when investors are risk averse toward the diffusion risk sources (asset payoff and back-
ground risk) but risk neutral toward the jump risk sources (the uncertainty of arrival times of
idiosyncratic shocks and trade opportunities).20 Heterogeneity in the concave-quadratic com-
ponent of this utility can stand in for various reasons, such as heterogeneous beliefs about the
mean dividend rate or exogenous inventory cost, although I micro-found it using the preferred
interpretation of Duffie et al. (2007) based on hedging need.
Because investors are assumed to have quadratic utility, trading rules and prices end up
19This result is expected to depend on the quadratic specification of u(ρ, a). Indeed, the average price is
unaffected by frictions since the marginal utility flow is linear in type and asset position. On the other hand, a
more general intuition is underlined here: The asset demands of different type of investors are affected differently.
Hence, the aggregate demand does not have to be affected significantly.
20A partial justification for such preferences might be the competence hypothesis of Heath and Tversky (1991).
They argue and provide experimental support for that people have source-dependent risk aversion, where they
exhibit lower aversion toward risk sources they feel competent about due to experience. Investors’ feeling of
competence in the context of my model may be considered to be higher for the arrival of idiosyncratic shocks
and trade opportunities because these are experienced by investors at the individual level, while innovations of
the diffusion risks come from sources outside their experiential realm, such as firm fundamentals and overall
market sentiments.
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linear in asset positions and hedging needs. As a result, the part of investors’ decisions that
reflects the option value of search depends only on the aggregate conditions of the market
(i.e., only the first moment of the equilibrium asset holding distribution). This introduces
two limitations. First, the average marginal valuation of the market and, hence, the mean
of the equilibrium price distribution turn out to be unaffected by search frictions.21 Thus,
in this model, liquidity is priced at the investor pair level but not at the aggregate level.
Second, the quadratic utility specification preserves the precautionary motive for holding/selling
assets against expected trading delays but kills the precautionary motive against the variability
of trading delays and the uncertainty over asset position and hedging need of the particular
counterparty one will meet. Rather than an expected delay in finding a random counterperty
in the literal sense, it is best to interpret the expected trading delays in this model as capturing
a broad set of imperfections in the search process for a suitable counterparty, including the
mentioned higher-order uncertainties. Despite this limitation, my approach still provides an
improvement over the literature as the existing fully bilateral models22 feature trade quantities
that are totally invariant to the equilibrium distribution, including its first moment. My model
instead shows how aggregate market conditions become an important determinant of liquidity
provision incentives at the transaction level.
Finally, I do not impose any exogenous restrictions on bilaterally negotiated trade quantities.
This can be viewed as moving from one extreme (i.e., the {0, 1} restriction) in the literature to
the other. Both approaches come with advantages and disadvantages. A virtue of the {0, 1}
restriction is that it makes the analysis of intermediation chains very transparent because
all intermediation trades occur as non-split round-trip trades. This provides an ideal model
environment in which all trades can be assigned to an intermediation chain. However, the
observed trade size heterogeneity in many real-world OTC markets makes it difficult to assign
dealers’ trades to particular intermediation chains.23 Moreover, even in the municipal bond
market, where the trading is first and foremost considered to be about blocks of fixed sizes,
intermediation chains contain trade splits.24 In Appendix F, I empirically document that there is
21This is reminiscent of the result that, with unrestricted asset positions, the centralized market price is
invariant to search frictions in the partially centralized models like Gaˆrleanu (2009) and the special case of
Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) with log utility.
22See Afonso and Lagos (2015), Hugonnier et al. (2014), and Farboodi et al. (2015), for example.
23In their empirical paper about the municipal bond market, Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018) determine approximately
12 million chains of an average length of 1.5 using 72.2 million trades in their sample, which means they are
able to assign only 41 percent of the trades to intermediation chains.
24Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018)’s round-trip matching algorithm, which is actually conservative in catching split
trades, finds that 28 percent of the immediate round-trip trades (chains of length 1) contain splits.
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a considerable trade-size dispersion in the corporate bond market. In some other OTC markets
such as the foreign exchange market and the fed funds market, trade-size heterogeneity is even
more prevalent.25 My model with unrestricted trade sizes captures this heterogeneity in an
extreme fashion so that intermediation chains in which an investor trades −q units after having
traded q units become a zero probability event, implying that the second leg of a round-trip
trade is always a split trade.
4 The model’s implications
4.1 Trading volume
Let GV , defined as
GV (θ, λ) =
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′) |q [(θ, λ) , (θ′, λ′)]| gλ′ (θ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′,
denote individual instantaneous expected gross trading volume conditional on inventory level
and speed type. Similarly, one can define (unsigned) net trading volume, NV , as
NV (θ, λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′) q [(θ, λ) , (θ′, λ′)] gλ′ (θ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
In a frictionless market, the gross and the net trading volume would coincide because the
investor would trade at a single price against the entire market to satisfy her fundamental
trading need perfectly. In the OTC market, there is a discrepancy between the gross and the
net volume, reflecting the investor’s incentive to buy from one side of the market and to sell to
the other side in bilateral meetings in order to make profit from price dispersion. I label this
difference between gross and net trading volume as intermediation volume, IV , as it is caused
by the investor’s incentive to profitably provide intermediation to others instead of fundamental
trading.
It is true that fast investors engage in higher trading activity due to their higher meeting
rate with counterparties. However, the endogenous determination of trade quantities affects
trading volume on top of that direct effect. To isolate the effect of endogenous trade quantities
on trading volume, I define per meeting counterparts GVpm, NVpm, and IVpm of GV , NV , and
IV , respectively, by dividing them by m (λ,Λ).
25See Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) for the foreign exchange market and Afonso
and Lagos (2012) for the fed funds market.
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Proposition 5. Suppose ρ is symmetrically distributed around 0 and m(λ, λ′) = 2λλ
′
Λ
.Then
(i)
sgn
∂GV (θ, λ)
∂θ
= sgn
∂NV (θ, λ)
∂θ
= sgn θ and sgn
∂IV (θ, λ)
∂θ
= − sgn θ
for all λ ∈ (0,M ].
(ii)
∂GV (θ, λ)
∂λ
,
∂IV (θ, λ)
∂λ
> 0 and
∂NV (θ, λ)
∂λ
≥ 0 (with equality if θ = 0)
for all θ ∈ R.
(iii)
∂GVpm (θ, λ)
∂λ
,
∂IVpm (θ, λ)
∂λ
> 0 and
∂NVpm (θ, λ)
∂λ
≤ 0 (with equality if θ = 0)
for all θ ∈ R.
Part (i) of Proposition 5 shows how the trading volume depends on inventory level, con-
trolling for speed type. The finding is that gross and net volumes are higher when inventory
gets more extreme (i.e., |θ| gets larger), but intermediation volume gets larger as inventory gets
closer to 0. Consistent with the findings of Afonso and Lagos (2015), Atkeson et al. (2015),
and Hugonnier et al. (2014), investors with average marginal valuations tend to specialize in
intermediation. If an investor’s inventory is closer to 0, her marginal valuation is closer to the
average marginal valuation of the market, and hence, her incentive for rebalancing asset posi-
tion is smaller, leading to lower net trading volume for her. On the other hand, her marginal
valuation’s close positioning to the market average makes her a natural counterparty for both
investors on buy and sell sides of the market, increasing intermediation volume for her. In-
vestors with very high positive or negative inventories engage imperceptably in intermediation
as they are mostly concerned with correcting their asset position.
Endogenous intermediation models with the {0, 1} restriction on asset positions, such as
Hugonnier et al. (2014) and Shen et al. (2015), show that investors with average exogenous
valuations specialize as intermediaries. My model complements their results with an additional
dimension as endogenous asset position appears to be an important determinant of marginal
valuations in my model. When asset position is determined at the margin, having the aver-
age marginal valuation means holding the “correct” amount of assets, rather than having the
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average exogenous valuation. Indeed, any investor with any exogenous valuation (i.e., any ρ)
can be an intermediary if her asset position is correct (i.e., if she has close to 0 inventory).
In other words, in my setup with rich heterogeneity in holdings, intermediaries might be “low
valuation-low holding,” “average valuation-average holding,” or “high valuation-high holding”
investors.
The heterogeneity in speed types creates heterogeneity in intermediation activity, even con-
trolling for inventory level as part (iii) of Proposition 5 demonstrates. Specifically, fast investors
intermediate more due to the comparative advantage channel. Each bilateral negotiation re-
sults in a trade size more in line with the slower counterparty’s trading need and a trade price
that contains a speed premium benefitting the faster counterparty. Since fast investors trade
according to their counterparties’ trading needs this way, they provide more intermediation per
matching.
Importantly, Proposition 5 provides a device for distinguishing empirically among the models
of intermediation with different underlying heterogeneity. In the existing models with one-
dimensional heterogeneity, investors with moderate asset positions (Afonso and Lagos, 2015),
moderate exogenous valuations (Hugonnier et al., 2014, Chang and Zhang, 2016, and Shen et al.,
2015), or high meeting rates (Neklyudov, 2014 and Farboodi et al., 2015) are intermediaries.26
In my model, moderate asset position or moderate exogenous valuation are represented by low
inventory (i.e., |θ| close to 0), while high meeting rate means high λ. Part (i) of Proposition
5 shows that if the main determinant of intermediation patterns is asset position or exogenous
valuation, customers have higher net and gross volumes than intermediaries. On the other
hand, part (ii) of Proposition 5 shows that if the main determinant of intermediation patterns
is meeting rate, intermediaries have higher net and gross volumes than customers. The latter
situation fits better the observed trading patterns in real-world OTC markets. Because of
long intermediation chains, intermediaries’ gross volume exceeds customers’ gross volume in
OTC markets, such as the market for municipal bonds and asset-backed securities, as findings
of Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018) and Hollifield et al. (2017) indicate, respectively. These papers
analyze only the trades that occur for intermediation purposes and thus are silent about the
net trading volume. However, Siriwardane (2018) looks at both net and gross volume in the
CDS market and he finds that not only do dealers have higher gross volume than customers,
but they also account for higher net selling and net buying volume. To sum up, Proposition 5 is
26The models of Neklyudov (2014) and Farboodi et al. (2015) have also two-type heterogeneity in exogenous
valuations to generate gains from trade in the steady-state equilibrium. Since this heterogeneity is limited,
exogenous valuation does not constitute a dimension over which the patterns of intermediation are determined.
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suggestive of the fact that these empirical findings corroborate the endogenous dealer-customer
trading patterns that arise from heterogeneity in meeting rates rather than those that arise
from heterogeneity in asset positions or exogenous valuations.
4.2 Optimal inventory management
Using the result of Proposition 3 evaluated at n = 2, I obtain a linear functional equation
that pins down the cross-sectional variance of inventories, varg [θ|λ], for all λ ∈ [0,M ]. I also
derive an equation that relates varg [θ|λ] to the cross-sectional variance of marginal valuations,
varg [J1 (θ, λ) |λ], using Proposition 2. This analysis leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 6. The cross-sectional variance of inventories, varg [θ|λ], is increasing in λ. The
cross-sectional variance of marginal valuations, varg [J1 (θ, λ) |λ], is decreasing in λ.
This corollary first establishes the higher variability of inventories for fast investors. Propo-
sition 2 implies that fast investors trade aggressively according to their counterparties’ needs.
When they meet a buyer, they sell a lot. When they meet a seller, they buy a lot. This is
optimal for fast investors: Deviating from the desired position is less of a concern for them as
they do not expect to spend much time with their current position. As a result, fast investors’
positions exhibit large volatility. Figure 1 shows it graphically. At time 0, a fast and a slow
investor start trading with 0 inventory. As time passes, the two investors bump into other
investors randomly chosen from the equilibrium distribution. As anticipated, the fast investor’s
holding exhibits higher volatility.
Second, Corollary 6 establishes the lower variability of marginal valuations for fast investors.
The dispersion of marginal valuations among the investors with the same λ stems from the
difference in their current inventories. As fast investors have lower inventory aversion, we
observe lower dispersion in fast investors’ marginal valuation. This is true even though the
dispersion of inventories across fast investors is larger. Therefore, for investors who are trying
to correct their asset positions, fast investors become the natural counterparty since their
marginal valuations are always close to the average marginal valuation of the market.
To better understand the equilibrium inventory management behavior of investors, I derive
expressions for the expectation and variance of the post-trade inventory for an investor of type
(θ, λ) using the result of Proposition 3. The results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7. Suppose varg [θ | λ] represents the cross-sectional variance of inventories among
investors with speed type λ and m(λ, λ′) = 2λλ
′
Λ
. For an investor of type (θ, λ), the expectation
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Figure 1: Sample path of inventories and marginal valuations for two investors with different
speed types.
and variance of the inventory after her next trade opportunity are
E [θ + q | θ, λ] = θ
[
1− 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
]
(36)
and
var [θ + q | θ, λ]
= θ2var
[
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
| λ
]
+
M∫
0
λ′
Λ
varg [θ | λ′]
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)2
ψ (λ′) dλ′, (37)
respectively, where
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
∈ (0, 1) and var
[
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
| λ
]
∈ (0, 1)
are decreasing functions of λ.
Equation (36) of Proposition 7 reveals the mean reversion to 0-inventory behavior of in-
vestors. For an investor with inventory θ, the inventory level after her next trade is a random
variable that can take any real number value depending on the inventory level and the speed
type of her counterparty. However, when we look at the average of all the possible post-trade
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inventory levels, we see that it will be closer to 0 than her current inventory θ. How much it
becomes closer to 0 depends on her speed type. Proposition 7 shows that, controlling for the
inventory level, a slow investor becomes closer to 0-inventory than a fast investor would. This
is consistent with the fact that slow investors trade mostly to correct their holding and fast
investors to provide intermediation to their counterparties.
Equation (37) decomposes the variance of the post-trade inventory to a term related to
fundamental trading and another term related to intermediation. The first term, which depends
on the current inventory level, reflects the fact that an investor with higher (positive or negative)
inventory level will face more variability for her post-trade inventory level simply because she
is far away from her target asset position. The second term, which depends on the potential
counterparties’ inventory levels, captures the extent to which the counterparty’s trading need
will contribute to the variance of the post-trade inventory. Consistent with the optimal trading
behavior investors, Proposition 7 shows that as λ increases, the contribution of the former term
to the variance of the post-trade inventory decreases, while the contribution of the latter term
increases.
4.3 Intermediation markups
In this subsection, I focus on the cross-sectional relationship between investor centrality and in-
termediation markups. My analysis follows closely the markup calculations of empirical papers,
such as Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018), Di Maggio et al. (2017), and Hollifield et al. (2017). In the
calculation of intermediation markup, an essential step is to determine trades for intermediation
purposes. The empirical papers use a round-trip trade matching algorithm to determine which
trades occur for intermediation reason. In a round-trip trade, a dealer buys a certain amount
of the asset from a client. Later, the dealer sells the same amount of assets to another dealer
or to a client or sells to a group of clients and dealers in split amounts. In such a round-trip
trade, the notion of markup Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018) use, for example, is
1
Par
∑
x ParxPDx − PCD
PCD
,
where PCD is the price at which the dealer initially buys the asset and
1
Par
∑
x ParxPDx is the
par-weighted price at which the dealer sells later.
Now I will calculate the counterpart of this markup notion in my model. First, I have to
make sure that the initial trade at which an investor buys is a trade for intermediation purpose.
For this, I will calculate the price for an investor with 0 inventory. Any trade an investor with
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0 inventory conducts will happen to provide intermediation to her counterparty. Suppose the
investor has 0 inventory and speed type λ. And, suppose she meets a counterparty with speed
type λ′ and she buys θ units of the asset from this counterparty. Proposition 2 implies that the
transaction price of this particular trade will be
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1θ
4
(
3
r˜(λ)
+
1
r˜(λ′)
)
=
u2(ρ,A)
r
− κ1 θ
r˜ (λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
post-trade marg. val.
+
κ1
4
θ
(
1
r˜ (λ)
− 1
r˜ (λ′)
)
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
speed premium
After this transaction, the investor becomes of type (θ, λ). In the next instant, her net trading
behavior will be to try to revert to the 0-inventory condition. The average price at which this
mean reversion will take place is
E[Pq|θ, λ]
E[q|θ, λ] ,
where the expectation is taken over the potential counterparty types (θ′′, λ′′) in equilibrium.
Then calculations in Appendix C imply that the expected markup an investor with speed type
λ earns by providing intermediation in the amount of θ to another investor with speed type λ′
is
µ(θ, λ, λ′) = µihr(θ, λ, λ′) + µsp(θ, λ, λ′), (38)
where
µihr(θ, λ, λ
′) ≡
κ1θ
M∫
0
m(λ, λ′′)
2(r˜(λ)− r)
(
r˜(λ′′)
r˜(λ) + r˜(λ′′)
)2
1
r˜(λ)
ψ(λ′′)dλ′′
+
κ1
θ
M∫
0
m(λ, λ′′)
2(r˜(λ)− r)
r˜(λ)
(r˜(λ) + r˜(λ′′))2
varg[θ
′′|λ′′]ψ(λ′′)dλ′′
 1u2(ρ,A)
r
− κ1θ
4
(
3
r˜(λ)
+ 1
r˜(λ′)
)
and
µsp(θ, λ, λ
′) ≡
κ1θ4
 1
r˜(λ′)
− 2
M∫
0
m(λ, λ′′)
2(r˜(λ)− r)
(
r˜(λ′′)
r˜(λ) + r˜(λ′′)
)2
1
r˜(λ)
ψ(λ′′)dλ′′

+
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m(λ, λ′′)
2(r˜(λ)− r)
r˜(λ)− r˜(λ′′)
(r˜(λ) + r˜(λ′′))2
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ′′)
varg[θ
′′|λ′′]ψ(λ′′)dλ′′
 1u2(ρ,A)
r
− κ1θ
4
(
3
r˜(λ)
+ 1
r˜(λ′)
) .
As a whole, µ(θ, λ, λ′) can be interpreted as the dealer-specific expected intermediation profit
per unit of asset normalized by the initial buying price. This markup can be decomposed into
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two terms: a compensation for inventory-holding risk, µihr(θ, λ, λ
′), as implied by the changes
in the investor’s marginal valuation in response to change in inventory; and a speed premium,
µsp(θ, λ, λ
′), that is earned or paid by the investor. While the compensation for inventory-
holding risk is always positive, the speed premium can be negative or positive; i.e., the investor
can pay or receive speed premium depending on her speed type. One can easily verify that both
the sum of the first terms of µihr(θ, λ, λ
′), and µsp(θ, λ, λ′) and the sum of the second terms of
µihr(θ, λ, λ
′) and µsp(θ, λ, λ′) are positive if the normalizing price is positive, which means that,
as expected, the whole intermediation markup will be positive.27 This is in line with the fact
that the investors’ trading behavior is optimal. An investor with 0 inventory decides to buy the
asset only if the price at which she buys is low enough so that she earns profit in expectation
when she resells it later.
The first term of µihr(θ, λ, λ
′) inside the curly brackets, which is positive, reflects that the
investor initially lowers her marginal valuation below the average marginal valuation of the
market as she buys θ units of the asset from the investor with speed type λ′. This marginal
value reduction contributes positively to the markup. It is also increasing in θ, the amount by
which the investor increases her inventory. The second term, also positive, captures the expected
price impact of future counterparties stemming from their inventory positions; i.e., selling to a
future counterparty who has a strong need to buy yields extra return due to bargaining. Both
the first and the second terms of µsp(θ, λ, λ
′) inside the curly brackets, which can be non-zero
only if there is heterogeneity in speed types, are due to the fact that there is a speed premium in
negotiated prices (24). The first term, which is increasing in θ, reflects that when the investor
initially provides liquidity in a larger quantity, the speed premium (she receives or pays) tends
to be larger. The second term, which gets more extreme as varg[θ
′′|λ′′] increases, reflects the
fact that a higher variability of inventories across future potential counterparties also tends to
increase the expected speed premium (received or paid).
The relationship between centrality and markup will be reflected by the sign of the deriva-
tive of µ(θ, λ, λ′) with respect to λ. The normalizing price in the denominator contributes
negatively to this derivative because, fixing the quantity of liquidity θ, a fast investor provides
liquidity at a more attractive price for her counterparty thanks to her lower aversion toward
inventory risk. The numerator of µsp(θ, λ, λ
′) contributes positively to the derivative as λ in-
creases the investor receives a larger speed premium (or pays a smaller speed premium). For
27If θ is too large, the normalizing price can be negative. In this case, the expected intermediation profit
is still positive, but the markup calculation is not meaningful. Thus, in the analysis of markups, I focus my
attention on the case in which θ is small enough.
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small values of λ or if varg[θ
′′|λ′′]s are small enough, the numerator of µihr(θ, λ, λ′) contributes
negatively to the derivative because, fixing θ, a fast investor requires lower compensation for
taking inventory-holding risk. For large values of λ or if varg[θ
′′|λ′′]s are large enough, the nu-
merator of µihr(θ, λ, λ
′) contributes positively because a fast investor keeps herself exposed to a
large amount of inventory risk in the process of unloading her initial inventory, by prioritizing
her future counterparties’ trading needs over her own. Collecting all these effects together, sign-
ing the derivative of markup with respect to λ is not easy. However, the following proposition
does this for special cases of interest.
Proposition 8. Suppose m(λ, λ′) = 2λλ
′
Λ
and the support of the distribution of λs is
[
1
8
,M
]
for M > 1
8
. Suppose θ > 0 is small enough so that
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1θ
4
(
3
r˜(λ)
+
1
r˜(λ′)
)
> 0
for all λ ∈ [1
8
,M ]. Let µ(θ, λ, λ′) denote the expected intermediation markup of an investor with
speed type λ when she provides θ amount of liquidity to an investor with speed type λ′ given by
(38). Then there exist v(θ, λ′) > v(θ, λ′) > 0 such that
(i) ∂µ(θ,λ,λ
′)
∂λ
< 0 if var[θ′′|λ′′] < v(θ, λ′) for all λ′′ ∈ [1
8
,M ] and
(ii) ∂µ(θ,λ,λ
′)
∂λ
> 0 if var[θ′′|λ′′] > v(θ, λ′) for all λ′′ ∈ [1
8
,M ].
Proposition 8 shows that if the equilibrium dispersion of inventories are small enough or
large enough, there is an unambiguous relationship between speed type and markup. This
unambiguous relationship arises when the speed premium effect is strong enough or weak enough
against the stable marginal valuation effect. When the dispersion of inventories is small enough,
the dominant determinant of markup is the first term of µihr(θ, λ, λ
′). Investors with high λ
tend to earn lower markups since they have stable marginal valuations that do not fluctuate
much in response to changes in asset position, reflecting their small inventory-holding cost. In
this case, fast investors earn lower markups. When the dispersion of inventories is large enough,
the dominant determinant of markup is the second term of µsp(θ, λ, λ
′), which stems from the
speed premium in negotiated prices. As can be seen from (24) and (23), for the speed premium
effect to be strong enough, the inventory levels, |θ|, must be large enough; i.e., investors’ need
for immediacy must be large enough. If this is the case, fast investors earn higher markups.
Consequently, my model rationalizes both the centrality premium and the centrality discount
in intermediation markups, which are empirically documented in distinct works.
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The equilibrium dispersion of inventories can be interpreted as a level of illiquidity. The
dispersion of inventories will be small in very liquid or very illiquid markets. Investors would
not need to deviate from their desired position in very liquid markets, and they would not
want to deviate at all in very illiquid markets, and hence, the dispersion of inventories will be
small in such markets. Therefore, the speed premium effect will be dominated, and a negative
relationship between speed type and markup will arise in the cross section of investors. This
implies that, for the positive relationship between speed type and markup to arise, the level of
illiquidity must be moderate. This implication of my model sheds light on the empirical findings
regarding the centrality discount vs. premium documented in different OTC markets. Hollifield
et al. (2017) find that central dealers earn lower markups in the markets for asset-backed
securities, mortgage-backed securities, and collateralized debt obligations, which are considered
to be very liquid markets. On the other hand, a centrality premium is documented for the
municipal bond market (Li and Schu¨rhoff, 2018) and the corporate bond market (Di Maggio
et al., 2017), which are considered to be moderately illiquid markets. To my knowledge, the
relationship between centrality and dealer markup has not been studied for very illiquid markets,
such as the real-estate, business-aircraft, or art markets. In light of the centrality-markup
relationship that arises in the equilibrium of my model, that there must be a centrality discount
in these markets can be regarded as a novel testable implication, which has not been explored
yet.
5 Welfare and policy
5.1 Constrained inefficiency
In this subsection, I investigate whether the fully decentralized market structure with unre-
stricted positions is able to reallocate the assets efficiently. I take the frictions as given and
ask how a benevolent social planner would choose the quantity of assets transferred in bilateral
meetings between investors. I define social welfare as the discounted sum of the utility flows of
all investors,
W =
∞∫
0
e−rt

M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
u (ρ, a)φt (ρ, a, λ) dρdadλ
 dt. (39)
Any transfer of the nume´raire good from one investor to another does not enter W because of
quasi-linear preferences. The planner maximizesW with respect to controls, qt [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)],
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subject to the laws of motion for the state variables, φt (ρ, a, λ), and to the feasibility condition
of asset reallocation,
qt [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)] + qt [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)] = 0, (40)
which also results in the imposition that the solution does not depend on the identities or
“names” of investors. In Appendix D, I write down the planner’s current-value Hamiltonian.
Then, using it, I show that ODEs for the co-state variables in an optimum are
rϑ (ρ, a, λ)−
.
ϑ (ρ, a, λ) = u (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
(ϑ (ρ′, a, λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)) f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {ϑ (ρ, a+ q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)
+ϑ (ρ′, a′ − q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ′)− ϑ (ρ′, a′, λ′)}φ (ρ′, a′, λ′) dρ′da′dλ′
s.t.
ϑ2 (ρ, a+ q
∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ) = ϑ2 (ρ′, a′ − q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ′) .
Checking that the planner’s optimality conditions do not coincide with the equilibrium con-
ditions is easy. More specifically, the comparison with Equation (15) reveals that the planner’s
optimality conditions and the equilibrium conditions would be identical if there was not 1/2
in front of the matching function in the equilibrium condition. This difference is because of a
composition externality typical of ex post bargaining environments, as discussed by Afonso and
Lagos (2015). An individual investor of current type (ρ, a, λ) internalizes only half the surpluses
that her trades create. As a result, she does not internalize fully the social benefit that arises
from the fact that having her in the current state (ρ, a, λ) increases the meeting intensity of all
other investors with an investor of type (ρ, a, λ).
The solution method for the planner’s problem is exactly the same as the solution method
I used for equilibrium. In the end, the difference between the planner’s solution and the
equilibrium solution boils down to the use of a different endogenous inventory aversion. The
inventory aversion that the benevolent social planner would assign to investors with λ solves
the functional equation
r˜∗ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′. (41)
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In other words, the planner wants investors to trade as if the matching function is 2m (λ, λ′)
instead of m (λ, λ′). The quantities chosen by the planner are given by
q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] =
− κ1
r˜∗(λ)θ
∗(ρ, a, λ) + κ1
r˜∗(λ′)θ
∗(ρ′, a′, λ′)
κ1
r˜∗(λ) +
κ1
r˜∗(λ′)
, (42)
where
θ∗(ρ, a, λ) = a− A+ κ2
κ1
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + α
(ρ− ρ) . (43)
The comparison of (42) and (43) with Proposition 2 reveals two types of distortions that the
OTC market frictions create for investors’ decision on the intensive margin. First, controlling
for inventory levels, investors exchange smaller quantities of the asset in equilibrium compared
to the social efficient quantities, because, in equilibrium, their marginal valuation is more
sensitive to current inventory level. Note that, for this distortion to be present, there must be
heterogeneity in speed types. Second, the calculation of inventory in the equilibrium and in the
planner’s problem are different. More specifically, in the equilibrium problem, investors come
up with smaller inventories to dampen their net trading need. This effect would be present
even without heterogeneity in speed types.
Given the socially optimal trade quantities described above, the distribution of inventories
solves the following system of Fourier transforms:
0 = − (α +m (λ,Λ)) ĝ∗ρ,λ (z) + α
1∫
−1
e−i2pi(ρ−ρ
′)C∗(λ)zĝ∗ρ′,λ (z) f (ρ
′) dρ′ (44)
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) ĝ∗ρ,λ
(
z
1 + r˜
∗(λ′)
r˜∗(λ)
)
ĝ∗ρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜
∗(λ′)
r˜∗(λ)
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′
for all λ ∈ [0,M ], ρ ∈ [−1, 1] and for all z ∈ R;
ĝ∗ρ,λ(0) = 1
for all λ ∈ [0,M ] and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]; and
M∫
0
1∫
−1
(
ĝ∗ρ,λ
)′
(0)f (ρ)ψ (λ) dρdλ = 0,
where
C∗ (λ) ≡ κ2
κ1
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + α
.
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It is important to note that this constrained inefficiency of the fully decentralized market
equilibrium follows from the interaction of investor heterogeneity and unrestricted asset posi-
tions. The literature has already established that the equilibrium is constrained efficient when
one of these elements is missing. Farboodi et al. (2015) show in their model with {0, 1} holding
that the equilibrium trade quantities are the same as the planner’s quantities, given the distri-
bution of speed types. In other words, whenever it is optimal for the planner to transfer one
indivisible unit of the asset from one investor to the other, investors themselves would also find
it optimal do the same thing, although privately they would attach a different value to doing
so. Afonso and Lagos (2015) show that if there is no investor heterogeneity, the equilibrium
of a fully decentralized market with unrestricted holdings is constrained efficient, even though
there is a composition externality. Because all investors are identical in their exogenous char-
acteristics, their marginal valuations are distorted in exactly the same way, so the negotiated
trade quantities coincide with the planner’s quantities.
5.2 Optimal tax/subsidy scheme on financial transactions
In the previous subsection, I showed that the distortion of investors’ decisions on the intensive
margin leads to too cautious a trading behavior relative to the constrained efficient trading
behavior. In this subsection, I show how trade-size dependent transaction taxes/subsidies
help eliminate this distortion. Suppose trading q units of the asset incurs a tax payment of
τ1(λ)(2aq + q
2)/2 + τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) q on the investor of type (ρ, a, λ).28 On the regulators’ side,
implementing such a policy in practice would require measuring the transaction frequencies
of market participants and monitoring their risk exposures and asset positions. The recently
implemented section of the Dodd-Frank Act, often referred to as “the Volcker Rule,” which
disallows proprietary trading by banks and their affiliates, also requires a similar level of mon-
itoring. Some proprietary-trading forms are exempted from the Volcker Rule, such as those
related to market making or hedging. Thus, regulators must monitor banks’ positions and
trading behavior and calculate certain metrics like transaction frequency or hedging need to
determine proprietary trading unrelated to hedging or market making.
28Financial transaction taxes that are quadratic in trade size are also used in centralized market models,
such as Subrahmanyam (1998) and Dow and Rahi (2000). The benefit of this specification is that it does not
generate inaction regions in CARA-normal environments, and hence, allows for analytical and interior solution
for trading rules.
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The bargaining problem of investors in the OTC market equilibrium with taxes will be
{q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]}
= arg max
q,P
[
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)− Pq − 1
2
τ1(λ)(2aq + q
2)− τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) q
] 1
2
[
J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′) + Pq − 1
2
τ1(λ
′)(−2a′q + q2) + τ2(λ′) (ρ′ − ρ) q
] 1
2
,
s.t.
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)− Pq − 1
2
τ1(λ)(2aq + q
2)− τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) q ≥ 0,
J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′) + Pq − 1
2
τ1(λ
′)(−2a′q + q2) + τ2(λ′) (ρ′ − ρ) q ≥ 0.
The first-order necessary and sufficient conditions and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that
the trade size, q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], maximizes the joint surplus net of total transaction tax;
and the transaction price, P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], is set so that the maximized surplus net of
total transaction tax is split equally between the bargaining parties; i.e., q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]
and P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] solve the system
J2(ρ, a+ q, λ)− τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ)− τ1(λ)a
= J2(ρ
′, a′ − q, λ′) − τ2(λ′) (ρ′ − ρ) − τ1(λ′)a′ + [τ1(λ) + τ1(λ′)] q
P =
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)− (J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′))
2q
− 1
2
[τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) + τ2(λ′) (ρ′ − ρ) + τ1(λ)a+ τ1(λ′)a′]− 1
4
[τ1(λ)− τ1(λ′)] q.
Using this result, the HJB equation of investors becomes
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = u (ρ, a) + T + α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
2
[
max
q
{J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ) + J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′)
− [τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ)− τ2(λ′) (ρ′ − ρ) + τ1(λ)a− τ1(λ′)a′] q
−1
2
[τ1(λ) + τ1(λ
′)] q2
}]
Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′),
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where
T =
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
(
τ1(λ)
2
{
2aq [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + (q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)])2
}
+τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]) Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)Φ(dρ, da, dλ)
is the flow transfer from the government to investors.
The solution method for this problem is exactly the same as the solution method I used for
equilibrium without taxes. The trade quantities in the equilibrium with taxes turn out to be
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] =
[
κ1 + rτ1(λ)
r˜ (λ)
+
κ1 + rτ1(λ
′)
r˜ (λ′)
]−1
[
−κ1 − (r˜ (λ)− r) τ1(λ)
r˜ (λ)
θ(ρ, a, λ) +
κ1 − (r˜ (λ′)− r) τ1(λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
θ(ρ′, a′, λ′)
−τ1(λ)a− τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) + τ1(λ′)a′ + τ2(λ′) (ρ′ − ρ)] , (45)
where
θ(ρ, a, λ) = a− A+ κ2 − (r˜ (λ)− r) τ2(λ)
κ1 − (r˜ (λ)− r) τ1(λ)
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + α
(ρ− ρ) (46)
and
r˜ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
κ1−(r˜(λ)−r)τ1(λ)
r˜(λ)
κ1+rτ1(λ)
r˜(λ)
+ κ1+rτ1(λ
′)
r˜(λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′. (47)
Given this equilibrium trading behavior under the presence of taxes, the optimal policy is to
choose τ1(λ) and τ2(λ) so that the equilibrium trade quantities (45) coincide with the con-
strained efficient trade quantities (42):
Proposition 9. Suppose an investor of type (ρ, a, λ) pays a financial transaction tax in the
amount of τ1(λ)(2aq + q
2)/2 + τ2(λ) (ρ− ρ) q whenever she trades q units of the asset and
receives a flow payment T from the government regardless of her type, where T is equal to
the instantaneous per capita tax collected by the government. Let r˜∗ (λ) be the solution of the
functional equation (41). The tax/subsidy scheme that decentralizes the constrained efficient
allocation is
τ1(λ) =
−κ1
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ)− r
r˜∗ (λ) + r
,
τ2(λ) =
−rκ2
(r + α) (α + r˜∗ (λ))
r˜∗ (λ)− r
r˜∗ (λ) + r
,
44
and
T =
M∫
0
τ(λ)ψ(λ)dλ,
where
τ(λ) ≡ κ
2
2
κ1
rα
r + α
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + r
(
r˜∗ (λ)− r
r˜∗ (λ) + α
)2
var[ρ],
which is a strictly increasing function of λ. Under this tax/subsidy scheme, the present value
of net payment that an investor with speed type λ will receive from the government is
1
r
(−τ(λ) + T ) .
The social inefficiency in the OTC market equilibrium manifests itself in two intensive
margin effects. First, investors’ marginal valuation is more sensitive to inventories than the
socially efficient marginal valuations. Thus, controlling for inventories, investors trade more
cautiously leading to a less dispersed asset position distribution than the socially efficient asset
position distribution. Second, in the calculation of (excess) inventories, investors put less weight
on their current hedging need, which leads to less dispersed inventories. The roles of τ1(λ) and
τ2(λ) are essentially to correct these two distortions, respectively.
Proposition 9 shows that τ1(λ) is negative. This means that it is a subsidy whenever an
investor with holding a trades in a way that her post-trade asset position is more extreme than
|a|. Similarly, it is a tax whenever the investor ends up with a post-trade position less extreme
than |a|. In short, τ1(λ) gives investors incentive to increase the dispersion of asset position
distribution. Over the lifetime of an investor, these taxes and subsidies stemming from terms
with τ1(λ) net out to zero.
In a similar fashion to τ1(λ), τ2(λ) gives investors incentive to make their inventories more
dispersed. In particular, τ2(λ) encourages an investor to sell when she has a large hedging
need (lower ρ than ρ) and encourages her to buy when she has a small hedging need (higher ρ
than ρ). Over an investor’s lifetime, these taxes and subsidies stemming from terms with τ2(λ)
net out to a payment from the investor to the government simply because investors receive
idiosyncratic hedging-need shocks over time. During normal times, liquidity provision behavior
typically leads to a subsidy and mean reversion to target holding leads to a tax, and these cancel
each other out. However, immediately following an idiosyncratic shock, it takes the investor
some time to reach her new target position, and she pays taxes during these episodes.
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Finally, Proposition 9 tells us that, in the optimal policy, fast investors cross-subsidize
slow investors. The root cause of inefficiency in this environment is the ex post bargaining,
which makes fast investors capture a larger transaction surplus than their contribution. The
optimal policy corrects this inefficiency by reallocating the nume´raire from fast investors to
small investors in a particular way. Again, this shows us the importance of recognizing the
correct source of heterogeneity in shaping the patterns of intermediation. In an alternative
model without heterogeneity in speed types, there would still be social inefficiency because one
of the two intensive margin distortions would be present. However, the optimal policy would
contain no long-term cross-subsidization. Over their lifetimes, all investors would receive an
equal amount of money to the amount they pay.
6 Comparison with the static network approach to OTC
markets
Currently, there are two dominant approaches in modelling OTC markets: the dynamic search
approach, which my paper belongs to; and the static network approach, with papers such as
Babus and Kondor (2013) and Malamud and Rostek (2017). In this section, I will define and
solve for an equilibrium in the static network counterpart of my baseline economic environment.
My search model allows for a meaningful comparison of the two approaches because, unlike other
search models but similarly to network models, it has the following features at the same time:
(i) trade is fully decentralized, (ii) trade quantities are unrestricted, and (iii) intermediation
arises as a result of the heterogeneity in (expected) number of counterparties.
6.1 Environment and equilibrium
Time is discrete with two dates t ∈ {0, 1}. There are I atomic investors indexed by i ∈
{1, 2, ..., I} who are subjective expected utility maximizers with CARA felicity functions. The
investors’ common coefficient of absolute risk aversion is denoted by γ. There is one divisible
risky asset in fixed per capita supply denoted by A > 0. At t = 0−, investor i starts with
a0i ∈ R shares of the asset such that
1
I
I∑
i=1
a0i = A.
This asset is traded over the counter at t = 0+ and each share of the asset pays D ∼ N
(
κ0,
κ1
γ
)
at t = 1. In addition to the uncertain payoff from the asset position, an uncertain income
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ηi
iid∼N
(
κη,
κ22
κ1γ
)
realizes for investor i at t = 1. Importantly, this random income is correlated
with the asset payoff, and the correlation ρi ≡ corr(D, ηi) is heterogeneous across investors.
Investors are organized into a trading network, Ψ. A link ij ∈ Ψ implies that, at t = 0+,
investor i and investor j can bilaterally trade at a mutually agreeable quantity and price, which
are determined by the symmetric Nash bargaining protocol. Let Ψi denote the set of investors
linked to investor i and λi ≡ |Ψi| the number of investor i’s links. For each ij ∈ Ψ, let qij denote
the number of assets investor i purchases and Pij the unit price of this transaction. Links in the
network are undirected such that if ij ∈ Ψ, then ji ∈ Ψ also, and ij and ji refer to the same
link. Thus, bilateral feasibility requires that qij = −qji and Pij = Pji. I adopt the convention
qij = 0 for all ij /∈ Ψ.
Let a1i denote investor i’s post-trade asset position:
a1i = a
0
i +
I∑
j=1
qij.
Then
E [Ui] = E
[
−e−γ(a1iD+ηi−
∑I
j=1 qijPij)
]
(48)
= −e−γ
(
κη− 12
κ22
κ1
)
e−γ[u(ρi,a
1
i )−
∑I
j=1 qijPij],
where
u (ρ, a) ≡ aκ0 − 1
2
a2κ1 − aρκ2. (49)
For all ij ∈ Ψ,
(qij, Pij) = arg max
q,P
{E [Ui]− E [U−ij]}
1
2 {E [Uj]− E [U−ji]}
1
2 , (50)
s.t.
E [Ui]− E [U−ij] ≥ 0,
E [Uj]− E [U−ji] ≥ 0,
where E [U−ij] is investor i’s expected utility if she decides not to trade with investor j, although
she is linked to him. Using (48) and after simplification, (50) becomes
(qij, Pij) = arg max
q,P
(
1− e−γ[u(ρi,a1−ij+qij)−u(ρi,a1−ij)−qijPij]
) 1
2
(
1− e−γ[u(ρj ,a1−ji−qij)−u(ρj ,a1−ji)+qijPij]
) 1
2
, (51)
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s.t.
1− e−γ[u(ρi,a1−ij+qij)−u(ρi,a1−ij)−qijPij] ≥ 0,
1− e−γ[u(ρj ,a1−ji−qij)−u(ρj ,a1−ji)+qijPij] ≥ 0,
where a1−ij is investor i’s post-trade asset position if she decides not to trade with investor j.
Definition 2. An equilibrium is (i) a set of prices {Pij | ij ∈ Ψ}, (ii) a set of trade quantities
{qij | ij ∈ Ψ}, and (iii) a set of bargaining threat points (or outside options)
{
a1−ij | ij ∈ Ψ
}
,
such that
• Nash bargaining: Given (iii), (i) and (ii) satisfy (51).
• Consistency: Given (ii), (iii) is consistent with the optimal trading behavior:
a1−ij =
∑
k∈Ψi\{j}
qik.
6.2 Characterization of the equilibrium
The solution (qij, Pij) of the constrained optimization problem (51) satisfies the system
u2
(
ρi, a
1
−ij + qij
)
= u2
(
ρj, a
1
−ji − qij
)
(52a)
Pij =
u
(
ρi, a
1
−ij + qij
)− u (ρi, a1−ij)− (u (ρj, a1−ji − qij)− u (ρj, a1−ji))
2qij
. (52b)
Using (49), the solution is
qij =
a1−ji − a1−ij
2
+
κ2
κ1
ρj − ρi
2
, (53a)
Pij = κ0 − κ1
(
a1−ij + a
1
−ji
2
+
κ2
κ1
ρi + ρj
2
)
. (53b)
Using a1−ij = a
1
i − qij, (53a) can be written as
qij = a
1
−ji − a1i +
κ2
κ1
(ρj − ρi) .
Summing over all counterparties of investor i, except for one particular counterparty j,
a1−ij − a0i =
∑
k∈Ψi\{j}
a1−ki − (λi − 1) a1i +
κ2
κ1
 ∑
k∈Ψi\{j}
ρk − (λi − 1) ρi
 . (54)
Equation (54) shows that calculating the equilibrium threat point of investor i when bargaining
with investor j requires using the hedging need type of all of investor i’s other counterparties as
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well as their threat points when bargaining with investor i. In principle, this situation, combined
with intricate local network patterns, might make the equilibrium computation problematic.
As a result, I will employ mean-field approximation at this point.29 I assume:
1
λi − 1
∑
k∈Ψi\{j}
ρk ≈ 1
I
I∑
k=1
ρk ≡ ρ
and
1
λi − 1
∑
k∈Ψi\{j}
a1−ki ≈
1
I
I∑
k=1
a1k = A
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, where the last equality holds due to market clearing. What is imposed
economically by this approximation is that when two investors bargain over the terms of trade,
the characteristics of their other counterparties do not matter. What matters is only the number
of counterparties they have.
There are two reasons why I adopt this approximation. First, in cases where the equilibrium
computation issues arise due to intricate local network patterns, network researchers resort to
similar “tricks.”30 Second, this approximation is actually in the spirit of Law of Large Numbers,
which could be applied exactly in search models. Thus, applying this approximation method
will increase the comparability of this network model and the original search model I solve.
Applying the mean-field approximation to (54) and rearranging,
a1−ij =
1
λi
a0i +
λi − 1
λi
[
A− qij + κ2
κ1
(ρ− ρi)
]
. (55)
Equation (55) gives us a1−ij as a function of a
0
i , ρi, qij, and λi. The main reason why the initial
endowment, a0i , is a determinant of a
1
−ij is the price impact. The presence of price impact due to
bargaining makes the investor unload her initial endowment to her counterparties imperfectly.
Naturally, a0i enters the equation positively because even if the investor does not trade with
investor j, a higher initial endowment leads to higher asset position for her. The hedging
need type, ρi, enters the equation negatively because higher ρi means low hedging benefit, and
hence, the investor expects to sell. Importantly, qij is a determinant of a
1
−ij, which reveals that
the investor tries to coordinate simultaneously all her trades with all counterparties. If the
29This approximation is commonly used in network models in natural sciences. For instance, see Gao, Barzel,
and Baraba´si (2016). To my knowledge, Su (2018) has the first application of this in the finance field.
30In Jackson and Yariv (2007) and Galeotti, Goyal, Jackson, Vega-Redondo, and Yariv (2009), agents make
decisions before knowing the identity of their counterparties. In Kelly, Lustig, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2013),
the dispersion in a firm’s customer set is approximated by the dispersion of the entire customer population.
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investor purchases a high quantity of the asset from investor j, she will reduce the quantity she
purchases from her other counterparties, and vice versa. Finally, λi has the role of determining
the relative weight of initial endowment in a1−ij. When the investor has a larger number of
counterparties, she has the opportunity of unloading a larger fraction of her initial endowment
to others.
Substituting (55) into (53a) and (53b), all equilibrium objects can be written as a function
of initial endowment, hedging need type, and number of counterparties, which leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 10. Let
θi = a
0
i − A+
κ2
κ1
(ρi − ρ) (56)
denote the “inventory” of investor i, stemming from her initial endowment and hedging need. In
equilibrium with mean-field approximation, for all ij ∈ Ψ, individual trade sizes and transaction
prices are given by
qij =
−κ1
λi
θi +
κ1
λj
θj
κ1
λi
+ κ1
λj
(57)
and
Pij = u2 (ρ,A)− κ1 θi + θj
λi + λj
. (58)
To understand the differences in investors’ trading behavior in the dynamic search model
and the static network model, one can directly compare Proposition 10 with Proposition 2.
Comparing Equation (56) with (21) implies that the number of counterparties is a determinant
of inventory only in the dynamic search model. Indeed, the reason why investors scale down
the coefficient of hedging need in calculation of inventories in the dynamic search model is that
they prefer their asset positions to partially hedge them against future idiosyncratic shocks, too.
As having higher number of counterparties makes investors less afraid of future idiosyncratic
shock, the number of counterparties becomes a determinant of inventory. Since there are no
future idiosyncratic shocks in the static environment of the network model, initial endowment
and hedging need type are the only determinants of inventory.
Comparing (57) with (23) implies that the reciprocal of the number of counterparties has
the role of determining the weight of an investor’s inventory in the trade quantity in both
models. In the static network model, the advantage of a fast investor in liquidity provision
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is being able to unload any unwanted asset-position portion from a trade to a larger number
of counterparties in the cross section, while the advantage in the dynamic search model is
being able to unload any unwanted asset-position portion from a trade to a larger number of
counterparties (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) over a fixed period of time.
However, the number of counterparties enters linearly in the network model, while it enters
with a concave transformation in the search model. This means that the marginal liquidity
provision incentive from having access to one additional counterparty stays constant in the
network model, while it is decreasing in the search model. This difference arises due to the
static vs. dynamic nature of the two models. In the search model, the calculation of r˜ (λ)
takes into account the fact that a fast investor’s post-trade inventory in her future trades will
be dictated, to a large extent, by her counterparties’ trading needs, which creates a secondary
negative impact of λ on r˜ (λ) leading to concavity. This effect is missing in the static network
model because an investor conducts all her trades simultaneously so she coordinates directly
all her trades as shown by Equation (55).
Finally, comparing (58) with (24) reveals that there is no “connectedness” premium in the
network model. The root cause of this difference is, again, the static vs. dynamic nature
of the two models. Since the network model is static, there is no concept of option value of
continuing search, and hence, there does not arise a sensitivity differential across investors’
marginal valuations due to the different number counterparties they have. As is clear from
(52a) and (52b), the bargaining parties contribute equally to the trade surplus and then split
it equally by taking the threat points as given. Because there is no discrepancy between the
contributed and captured shares of surplus, the transaction price becomes equal to the effective
post-trade marginal valuation when we write the price as a function of inventories defined
according to the initial endowment. Thus, the speed premium term of (24) that appears in the
search model does not appear in (58) of the network model.
7 Conclusion
OTC markets played a significant role in the 2007-2008 financial crisis, as derivative securities,
collateralized debt obligations, repurchase agreements, and many other assets are traded OTC.
Accordingly, understanding the functioning of these markets, detecting potential inefficiencies,
and proposing regulatory action have become a focus of attention for economists and policy
makers. This paper contributes to a fast-growing body of literature on OTC markets by pre-
senting a search-and-bargaining model a` la Duffie et al. (2005). I complement this literature
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by considering investors who can differ in their meeting rates, time-varying hedging needs, and
asset positions. By means of its multi-dimensional rich heterogeneity, my model allows for a
formulation of precise empirical predictions, which can distinguish different dimensions of het-
erogeneity. Based on this formulation, I argue that the heterogeneity in meeting rates is the
main driver of intermediation patterns. I show that investors with higher meeting rates (i.e.,
fast investors) arise endogenously as the main intermediation providers. Then, as observed in
the data, they trade in larger quantities and hold more extreme inventories. They can earn
higher or lower markups than slow investors, depending on the equilibrium dispersion of inven-
tories. Both are observed in real-world OTC markets. The model’s insight into the meeting
rate heterogeneity being the main driver of intermediation patterns is also important for po-
tential policy implications. I provide a financial transaction tax/subsidy scheme that corrects
the inefficiency created by OTC frictions. Importantly, as a result of this scheme, fast investors
cross-subsidize slow investors. In an equilibrium in which intermediation arises only from other
sources of heterogeneity, this cross-subsidization would not be arising.
This paper leads to several avenues for future research. First, the stationary equilibrium in
this paper is silent about the role of intermediation in times of financial distress. Thus, I plan
to study the transitional dynamics of intermediation following an aggregate liquidity shock.
The dynamics of the price and supply of liquidity along the recovery path could inform the
debate on optimal policy during crises. Second, this paper presents a single-asset model. I plan
to analyze how intermediation patterns change in a setup with multiple assets. This analysis
could lead to interesting dynamics of liquidity across markets, as maintaining high inventory in
one market would limit an intermediary’s ability to provide liquidity in other markets. Finally,
this paper is totally agnostic about why we observe an ex ante heterogeneity in meeting rates.
Given that this speed heterogeneity is an important source of intermediation, studying a model
with endogenous meeting rates would be a worthwhile way to explore whether the size of the
intermediary sector is socially efficient.
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Appendix A. Optimization
This appendix covers the stochastic control problem that an individual investor with the
reduced-form quasi-linear utility faces in the OTC market equilibrium of Section 2. I define the
investor’s problem and provide HJB equations and an optimality verification argument along
the lines of Duffie et al. (2005) and Vayanos and Weill (2008). I conclude by establishing the
existence and uniqueness of the solution to the individual investor’s problem taking as given
the joint distribution of hedging need types, asset positions, and speed types.
A.1 Investor’s problem
I fix a probability space (Ω,F ,Pr) and a filtration {Ft, t ≥ 0} of sub-σ-algebras satisfying the
usual conditions (see Protter, 2004). An investor can be of either one of the three-dimensional
continuum of types denoted by (ρ, a, λ) ∈ T ≡ [−1, 1]×R× [0,M ]. The arrival times of changes
of hedging need types and of potential counterparties are counted by two independent adapted
counting processes Nα and Nλ with constant intensities α and m (λ,Λ), respectively. The
details of these counting processes that govern idiosyncratic shocks and trade are as described
in Section 2.
An investor with initial type (ρ0, a0, λ) and initial wealth W0 chooses a feasible trading
strategy {at}t∈[0,∞) and an adapted consumption and wealth process {(ct,Wt)}t∈[0,∞) subject to
the following feasibility conditions. First, the type (ρt, at, λ) must remain constant during the
inter- and intra-arrival times of the counting processes Nα and Nλ. Second, when the investor
is in state (ρ, a, λ) ∈ T and when the process Nαt jumps, the investor transitions into the state
(ρ′, a, λ) ∈ T , where the investor’s new hedging need type, ρ′, is drawn according to the pdf f
on [−1,+1]. Third, when the investor is in state (ρ, a, λ) ∈ T and when the process Nλt jumps,
the investor transitions into the state (ρ, a + qt [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)] , λ) ∈ T , where the trade
quantity, qt [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)], is bargained with the counterparty of type (ρ′, a′, λ′) who is
drawn according to the stationary joint cdf, Φ(ρ′, a′, λ′), of hedging need types, asset positions,
and speed types, with the likelihood, m(λ,λ
′)
m(λ,Λ)
, that depends on her speed type λ′.31
First, I start by describing an investor’s continuation utility at time t from remaining lifetime
consumption. For a particular investor, the arguments of this continuation utility function are,
naturally, the investor’s current wealth Wt, her current type (ρt, at, λ), and time t. More
31Since investors have quasi-linear preferences, terms of trade are independent of wealth levels, as will be clear
shortly.
59
precisely, the continuation utility is
U (Wt, ρt, at, λ, t) = sup
C,a
Et
∞∫
0
e−rsdCt+s (A.1)
s.t.
dWt = rWtdt− dCt + u (ρt, at) dt− Pt [(ρt−, at−, λ) , (ρ′t, a′t, λ′t)] dat, (A.2)
dat =
{
qt [(ρt−, at−, λ) , (ρ′t, a
′
t, λ
′
t)] if there is contact with investor (ρ
′
t, a
′
t, λ
′
t)
0 if no contact,
where
{qt [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , Pt [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]} =
arg max
q,P
{
[U(W − qP, ρ, a+ q, λ, t)− U(W, ρ, a, λ, t)] 12
[U(W ′ + qP, ρ′, a′ − q, λ′, t)− U(W ′, ρ′, a′, λ′, t)] 12
}
,
s.t.
U(W − qP, ρ, a+ q, λ, t) ≥ U(W, ρ, a, λ, t),
U(W ′ + qP, ρ′, a′ − q, λ′, t) ≥ U(W ′, ρ′, a′, λ′, t).
where Et denotes expectation conditional on the information at time t, {Ct}t∈[0,∞) is a cumula-
tive consumption process, {(ρt, at, λ)}t∈[0,∞) is a T -valued type process induced by the feasible
trading strategy {at}t∈[0,∞), and the benefit u (ρt, at) has a similar holding benefit/cost interpre-
tation as in Duffie et al. (2005). The difference is that I assume the holding benefit is a concave
quadratic function of asset position while it is linear in Duffie et al. (2005). (A.1) and (A.2) im-
ply that the continuation utility is linear in wealth, i.e., U (Wt, ρt, at, λ, t) = Wt +J (ρt, at, λ, t),
where
J (ρt, at, λ, t) = sup
a
Et
∞∫
t
e−r(s−t)u (ρs, as) ds− e−r(s−t)Ps [(ρs−, as−, λ) , (ρ′s, a′s, λ′s)] das
 .
(A.3)
Finally, to guarantee the global optimality of the trading strategy induced by (A.3), I impose
the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
e−rtJ (ρ, a, λ, t) = 0 (A.4a)
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for all (ρ, a, λ) ∈ T and the condition
E
 T∫
0
(
e−rsJ (ρs, as, λ, s)
)2
ds
 <∞ (A.4b)
for any T > 0, for any initial investor type (ρ0, a0, λ), any feasible trading strategy {at}t∈[0,∞),
and the associated type process {(ρt, at, λ)}t∈[0,∞). These conditions will allow me to complete
the usual verification argument for stochastic control.
A.2 HJB equations
In order to derive J , q, and P , I focus on a particular investor and a particular time t. I let
τα be an exponential random variable that represents the next (stopping) time at which that
investor’s hedging need type changes, let τλ be an exponential random variable that represents
the next (stopping) time at which another investor is met, and let τ = min {τα, τλ}. Then,
J (ρt, at, λ, t) = Et
 τ∫
t
e−r(s−t)u (ρs, as) ds+ e−r(τα−t)I{τα=τ}
1∫
−1
J(ρ′, at, λ)f(ρ′)dρ′
+ e−r(τλ−t)I{τλ=τ}
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
{J(ρt, at + qτλ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)
−qτλ [(ρt, at, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]Pτλ [(ρt, at, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)] . (A.5)
Differentiating the both sides of (A.5) with respect to time argument t and suppressing it,
I arrive at
.
J (ρ, a, λ) = rJ(ρ, a, λ)− u(ρ, a)− α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
−
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {J(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)
−q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′). (A.6)
In steady state,
.
J (ρ, a, λ) = 0 and hence (A.6) implies the HJB equation (2) of Section 3.
After using the Nash bargaining procedure for the determination of q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] and
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P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], I get the auxiliary HJB equation (15) of Subsection 3.3:
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = κ0a− 1
2
κ1a
2 − κ2ρa+ α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
2
[
max
q
{J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)
+J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′)}] Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′). (A.7)
A.3 Optimality verification
Now, to verify the sufficiency of the HJB equation (2) for individual optimality, I consider any
initial investor type (ρ0, a0, λ), any feasible trading strategy {at}t∈[0,∞), and the associated type
process {(ρt, at, λ)}t∈[0,∞). I assume, without loss of generality, the wealth process is Wt = 0
for all t ≥ 0. Therefore, the resulting cumulative consumption process {Cat }t∈[0,∞) satisfies
dCat = u (ρt, at) dt− Pt [(ρt−, at−, λ) , (ρ′t, a′t, λ′t)] dat. (A.8)
At any time T > 0,
E
 T∫
0
e−rsdCas + e
−rTJ(ρT , aT , λ)

= E
 T∫
0
e−rsdCas + J(ρ0, a0, λ) +
T∫
0
d
(
e−rsJ(ρs, as, λ)
)
= E
J(ρ0, a0, λ) + T∫
0
e−rsdCas +
T∫
0
(−re−rsJ(ρs, as, λ)) ds+ T∫
0
e−rsd (J(ρs, as, λ))

= E
J(ρ0, a0, λ) + T∫
0
e−rs (dCas − rJ(ρs, as, λ) + (J(ρs, as, λ)− J(ρs−, as, λ)) dNαs
+ (J(ρs, as + qs [(ρs−, as−, λ) , (ρ′s, a
′
s, λ
′)] , λ)− J(ρs, as, λ)) dNλs
)]
, (A.9)
where Nαs and N
λ
s are counting processes that govern the arrivals of idiosyncratic shocks and
of potential counterparties, respectively. Note that any transfer of the nume´raire at an arrival
time of Nλ is reflected by Ca according to (A.8).
The next step is to calculate the stochastic integrals containing the counting processes. The
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condition (A.4b) implies that,
T∫
0
|J(ρs, as, λ)− J(ρs−, as, λ)| ds ≤ sup
s,s′∈[0,T ]
|J(ρs′ , as′ , λ)− J(ρs, as, λ)|T <∞.
Corollary C4 of Bre´maud (1981, p. 235), in turn, implies that
E
 T∫
0
e−rs (J(ρs, as, λ)− J(ρs−, as, λ)) dNαs

= E
 T∫
0
e−rsα

1∫
−1
(J(ρs, as, λ)− J(ρs−, as, λ)) f(ρ′s)dρ′s
 ds
 .
Similarly,
E
 T∫
0
e−rs (J(ρs, as + qs [(ρs−, as−, λ) , (ρ′s, a
′
s, λ
′)] , λ)− J(ρs, as, λ)) dNλs

= E
 T∫
0
e−rs

M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′s) (J(ρs, as + qs [(ρs−, as−, λ) , (ρ
′
s, a
′
s, λ
′)] , λ)
−J(ρs, as, λ)) Φ(dρ′s, da′s, dλ′s)} ds] .
Using these equalities in (A.9),
E
 T∫
0
e−rsdCas + e
−rTJ(ρT , aT , λ)

= E
J(ρ0, a0, λ) + T∫
0
e−rsdCas +
T∫
0
e−rs
α 1∫
−1
(J(ρs, as, λ)− J(ρs−, as, λ)) f(ρ′s)dρ′s
− rJ(ρs, as, λ) +
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′s) (J(ρs, as + qs [(ρs−, as−, λ) , (ρ
′
s, a
′
s, λ
′)] , λ)
−J(ρs, as, λ)) Φ(dρ′s, da′s, dλ′s)) ds]
≤ E
J(ρ0, a0, λ) + sup
C

T∫
0
e−rsdCs +
T∫
0
e−rs
α 1∫
−1
(J(ρs, as, λ)− J(ρs−, as, λ)) f(ρ′s)dρ′s
− rJ(ρs, as, λ) +
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′s) (J(ρs, as + qs [(ρs−, as−, λ) , (ρ
′
s, a
′
s, λ
′)] , λ)
−J(ρs, as, λ)) Φ(dρ′s, da′s, dλ′s)) ds}] = J(ρ0, a0, λ).
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This means that, at any future meeting date τn, n ∈ N,
J(ρ0, a0, λ) ≥ E
τn∫
0
e−rtdCat
+ E [e−rτnJ(ρτn , aτn , λ)] .
Then, letting n→∞ and using the transversality condition (A.4a), I find J(ρ0, a0, λ) ≥ U (Ca).
Since J(ρ0, a0, λ) = U (C
∗), where C∗ is the consumption process associated with the candidate
equilibrium strategy, I have established optimality.
A.4 Existence and uniqueness
In Appendix B, I will construct a solution to the HJB equation (A.7) for J(ρ, a, λ). Before
doing that, here I establish the fact that it admits a unique real solution, taking as given the
equilibrium joint cdf Φ(ρ, a, λ) of hedging need types, asset positions, and speed types. The
argument runs along the lines of the earlier models with unrestricted asset positions, such
as Gaˆrleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), and uses standard fixed point tools for
dynamic programming.
Lemma 3. Suppose Φ is a joint cdf such that
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
f (x) dΦ (x) <∞
for any f ∈ C (T ) ≡ {f : T → R |f is continuous and bounded from above}. Then, there exists
a unique solution to (15) (or A.7).
Proof. Rewrite (15) as
J(ρ, a, λ) =
1
r + α + 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
u (ρ, a) + α 1∫
−1
J(ρ′, a, λ)f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
[
max
q
{J(ρ, a+ q, λ) + J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)
−J(ρ′, a′, λ′)}] Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)) . (A.10)
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The RHS of (A.10) defines a mapping O:
(OJ) (ρ, a, λ) =
1
r + α + 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
u (ρ, a) + α 1∫
−1
J(ρ′, a, λ)f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
[
max
q
{J(ρ, a+ q, λ) + J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)
−J(ρ′, a′, λ′)}] Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)) . (A.11)
I want to show that there exists a unique solution J to OJ = J . Suppose J ∈ C (T ), then the
theorem of the maximum implies that the maximization on the RHS of (A.11) has a continuous
solution (Theorem 3.6 of Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p. 62). Then, using the assumed functional
form (1) for u (ρ, a), O : C (T ) → C (T ). I next show that O is a contraction mapping.
However, the usual procedure, i.e., checking the Blackwell’s conditions for a contraction, is not
sufficient in this case because C (T ) is not a space of bounded functions. To overcome this
issue, let Tn = [−1, 1] × [−n, n] × [0,M ]. C (Tn) with the usual sup norm ‖.‖ constitutes a
real Banach space. And, ‖J − J ′‖ < ∞ for all J, J ′ ∈ C (Tn) since the real-valued continuous
functions defined on a compact subset of R3 are bounded. Define the metric
d (J, J ′) =
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
‖J − J ′‖n
1 + ‖J − J ′‖n
,
where ‖.‖n is the usual sup norm on the set C (Tn). Araujo and Jarosz (2001) show that C (T )
with the metric d constitutes a complete metric space. Therefore, what I do next is to show
that O is a contraction mapping on (C (T ) , d). First, note that O satisfies monotonicity and
discounting properties. It is easy to verify the monotonicity, i.e. JA, JB ∈ C (T ) and JA ≤ JB
imply OJA ≤ OJB. To verify discounting, consider c ≥ 0. Then,
[O (J + c)] (ρ, a, λ) ≤ (OJ) (ρ, a, λ) + βc,
where
β =
α + 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
r + α + 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
∈ (0, 1) .
To prove that O is a contraction mapping, consider two arbitrarily chosen functions JA, JB ∈
C (T ) and fix n ∈ N+. By the definition of sup norm,
JA ≤ JB + ∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
.
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Since O has the monotonicity property,
OJA ≤ O (JB + ∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
)
.
Using the discounting property,
OJA ≤ OJB + β ∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
.
Applying the same procedure in reverse establishes
OJB ≤ OJA + β ∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
.
Therefore,∥∥OJA −OJB∥∥
n
≤ β ∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
.
This implies∥∥OJA −OJB∥∥
n
1 + ‖OJA −OJB‖n
≤ β
∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
1 + β ‖JA − JB‖n
<
∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
1 + ‖JA − JB‖n
,
i.e., ∥∥OJA −OJB∥∥
n
1 + ‖OJA −OJB‖n
<
∥∥JA − JB∥∥
n
1 + ‖JA − JB‖n
,
which holds for any n ∈ N+. Therefore,
d
(
OJA, OJB
)
< d
(
JA, JB
)
.
Since the inequality is strict, there exists β̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that
d
(
OJA, OJB
) ≤ β̂d (JA, JB) ,
which implies that O is a contraction mapping, with modulus β̂, on the complete metric space
(C (T ) , d). Hence, it follows from the contraction mapping theorem that O has a unique fixed
point J ∈ C (T ) (Theorem 3.2 of Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p. 50).
Appendix B. Proofs
B.0 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Part of the statements in Theorem 1 concern the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I
will now describe step by step how those results obtain and in what sense. Definition 1 lists J ,
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q, P , and Φ as the equilibrium objects. The methods that I use to characterize the equilibrium
allow for an analysis of the moments of the equilibrium distribution Φ, but do not allow for
an analysis of the function Φ itself. Thus, I establish that the functions J , q, and P , and all
moments of Φ exist and are unique.
1. Lemma 3 shows that J exists and is uniquely determined given Φ.
2. In the proof of Theorem 1, it is established that the unique J given Φ is a strictly concave
function. As a result, q is determined uniquely given this strictly concave J . In particular,
the equations (B.3a) and (B.5), combined with the unique positive solution of (19) (see
Lemma 1) characterize q. Similarly, P is determined uniquely by (B.3b), (B.3a) and
(B.5).
3. Steps 1-2 imply that J , q, and P are uniquely determined given Φ. Now, the key step is
to show that J , q, P , and Φ are jointly uniquely determined. Thanks to the assumptions
(i) that marginal utility is linear and additively separable in ρ and a and (ii) that the
distribution of ρs and the distribution of λs are independent, the core fixed-point problem
is reduced to two linear functional equations connecting the first moment of Φ conditional
on λ and the average marginal valuation conditional on λ: Equations (B.8) and (B.9).
The proof of Theorem 1 shows that there exists a unique solution to this fixed-point
problem. As a result, J , q, P , and the first moment of Φ are jointly uniquely determined.
4. Proposition 3 provides a recursive characterization, which pins down the higher order
moments of Φ uniquely.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1 and Lemma 2
Rewrite the auxiliary HJB equation (15) of Subsection 3.3:
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = κ0a− 1
2
κ1a
2 − κ2ρa+ α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
[
max
q
{
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)
2
+
J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′)
2
}]
Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′).
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Conjecture that
J(ρ, a, λ) = D (λ) + E (λ) ρ+ F (λ) a+G (λ) a2 +H (λ) ρa+M (λ) ρ2, (B.1)
implying
J2(ρ, a, λ) = F (λ) + 2G (λ) a+H (λ) ρ
and
J22(ρ, a, λ) = 2G (λ) .
Therefore, the value function can be written as
J(ρ, a, λ) = −G (λ) a2 + J2(ρ, a, λ)a+D (λ) + E (λ) ρ+M (λ) ρ2.
q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] is given by (12). Using the conjecture,
F (λ) + 2G (λ) a+ 2G (λ) q +H (λ) ρ = F (λ′) + 2G (λ′) a′ − 2G (λ′) q +H (λ′) ρ′.
Therefore,
q =
J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)− J2(ρ, a, λ)
2 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
.
Substituting back inside the conjectured marginal valuation, the post-trade marginal valuation
is
J2(ρ, a+ q, λ) = J2(ρ
′, a′ − q, λ′) = G (λ) J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
+G (λ′)
J2(ρ, a, λ)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
. (B.2)
P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] is given by (14). Using the fact that J(ρ, a, λ) is quadratic in a, a
second-order Taylor expansion shows that:
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ) = J2(ρ, a+ q, λ)q −G (λ) q2.
Then, Equation (14) implies
P =
q
2
(G (λ′)−G (λ)) + J2(ρ, a+ q, λ).
Hence, the terms of trade satisfy the system
q =
J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)− J2(ρ, a, λ)
2 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
, (B.3a)
P =
q
2
(G (λ′)−G (λ)) +G (λ) J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
+G (λ′)
J2(ρ, a, λ)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
. (B.3b)
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Using (B.2) and (B.3a), the implied trade surplus is
J(ρ, a+ q, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ) + J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′)
= −G (λ) (2aq + q2)+ J2(ρ, a+ q, λ) (a+ q)− J2(ρ, a, λ)a
−G (λ′) (−2a′q + q2)+ J2(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′) (a′ − q)− J2(ρ′, a′, λ′)a′
= −(J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)− J2(ρ, a, λ))2
4 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
.
Rewrite the investors’ problem by substituting the trade surplus implied by the Nash bar-
gaining solution:
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = κ0a− 1
2
κ1a
2 − κ2ρa+ α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
{
−(J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)− J2(ρ, a, λ))2
8 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
}
Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′). (B.4)
Therefore, my conjectured value function is verified after substituting the Nash bargaining
solution. The marginal valuation satisfies the flow Bellman equation:
rJ2(ρ, a, λ) = κ0 − κ1a− κ2ρ+ α
1∫
−1
[J2(ρ
′, a, λ)− J2(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
{
J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)− J2(ρ, a, λ)
4 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
2G (λ)
}
Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′).
Taking all terms which contain J2(ρ, a, λ) to the LHS,r + α + M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
G (λ)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
 J2(ρ, a, λ) = κ0 − κ1a− κ2ρ
+α
1∫
−1
J2(ρ
′, a, λ)f(ρ′)dρ′ +
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
G (λ)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′).
Substitute the conjectured marginal valuation and match coefficients:
(α + r˜ (λ)) (F (λ) + 2G (λ) a+H (λ) ρ)
= κ0 − κ1a− κ2ρ+ α
1∫
−1
[F (λ) + 2G (λ) a+H (λ) ρ′] f(ρ′)dρ′ + (r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) ,
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where
r˜ (λ) ≡ r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
G (λ)
G (λ) +G (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′,
J2 (λ) ≡
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′) G(λ)
G(λ)+G(λ′)J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)
r˜ (λ)− r .
Equivalently,
(α + r˜ (λ)) (F (λ) + 2G (λ) a+H (λ) ρ)
= κ0a− κ1a− κ2ρ + α (F (λ) + 2G (λ) a+H (λ) ρ) + (r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) .
Then, undetermined coefficients solve the system:
r˜ (λ)F (λ) = κ0 + αH (λ) ρ+ (r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) ,
r˜ (λ) 2G (λ) = −κ1, (B.5)
(α + r˜ (λ))H (λ) = −κ2.
Using the resulting G from the matched coefficients, the definition of r˜ (λ) implies
r˜ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
−κ1
2r˜(λ)
−κ1
2r˜(λ)
+ −κ1
2r˜(λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′.
Then, r˜ (λ) satisfies the recursive functional equation:
r˜ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′.
Using the matched coefficients,
J2 (ρ, a, λ) =
κ0 − κ1a− κ2 r˜(λ)ρ+αρr˜(λ)+α + (r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ)
r˜ (λ)
, (B.6)
where
J2 (λ) =
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′) r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′)Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)
r˜ (λ)− r .
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, I need to show that J2 (λ) =
u2(ρ,A)
r
. Using (B.6):
J2 (λ) =
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′) r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
[
κ0−κ1a′−κ2 r˜(λ
′)ρ′+αρ
r˜(λ′)+α +(r˜(λ
′)−r)J2(λ′)
r˜(λ′)
]
Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)
r˜ (λ)− r .
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After cancellations, and using the fact that meeting rate is independent of idiosyncratic hedging
need shocks,
(r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) =
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
1
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
(
κ0 − κ2ρ− κ1Eφ [a′ | λ′] + (r˜ (λ′)− r) J2 (λ′)
)
ψ(λ′)dλ′.
(B.7)
This equation reveals that the expected contribution of the market to an investor’s post-
trade marginal valuation depends on the mean of equilibrium holdings Eφ [a
′ | λ′] conditional on
meeting rate. It will be determined when I derive the first moment of equilibrium distribution.
Thus, the proof of Theorem 1 will be complete after the proof of Lemma 2. The following
lemma constitutes the starting point of the proof of Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. Given J2 (λ), the conditional pdf φρ,λ (a) of asset positions satisfies the system
(α +m (λ,Λ))φρ,λ (a) = α
1∫
−1
φρ′,λ (a) f(ρ
′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
φρ,λ (a
′)
φρ′,λ′
(
a
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− a′ − m˜D (λ, λ′) + C˜ [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]− J˜ (λ, λ′)
)
da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′,
where
m˜D (λ, λ
′) ≡ r˜ (λ
′)− r˜ (λ)
κ1r˜ (λ)
mD,
C˜ [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)] ≡ κ2
κ1
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) ρ+ αρ
r˜ (λ) + α
− r˜ (λ
′) ρ′ + αρ
r˜ (λ′) + α
)
,
J˜ (λ, λ′) ≡ r˜ (λ
′)
κ1r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ)− 1
κ1
(r˜ (λ′)− r) J2 (λ′) .
Proof. Assuming Φλ(ρ, a) is the joint cdf of hedging needs and asset positions conditional on
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speed type, rearrangement of Equation (8) yields
0 = −αΦλ∗(ρ∗, a∗) + α
a∗∫
−∞
1∫
−1
Φλ∗(dρ, da)F (ρ
∗)
−
a∗∫
−∞
ρ∗∫
−1
∞∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ∗, λ′) I{q[(ρ,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]>a∗−a}Φλ′(dρ′, da′)ψ(λ′)dλ′
Φλ∗(dρ, da)
+
∞∫
a∗
ρ∗∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ∗, λ′) I{q[(ρ,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]≤a∗−a}Φλ′(dρ′, da′)ψ(λ′)dλ′
Φλ∗(dρ, da)
for all λ∗ ∈ [0,M ]. I write the above condition in terms of conditional pdfs, by letting φρ,λ(a)
denote the conditional pdf of asset positions by investors with hedging need ρ and speed type
λ:
0 = −α
ρ∗∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ+ α
1∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρF (ρ
∗)
−
ρ∗∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ∗, λ′) I{q[(ρ,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]>a∗−a}
φρ′,λ′(a
′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′]φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ
+
ρ∗∫
−1
∞∫
a∗
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ∗, λ′) I{q[(ρ,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]≤a∗−a}
φρ′,λ′(a
′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′]φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ.
Using the expression for trade sizes implied by (B.3a), I can get rid of indicator functions
inside the integrals, using appropriate bounds:
0 = −α
ρ∗∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ+ αF (ρ
∗)
1∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ
−
ρ∗∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
∞∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
ξ[(ρ,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ
+
ρ∗∫
−1
∞∫
a∗
M∫
0
1∫
−1
ξ[(ρ,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]∫
−∞
m (λ∗, λ′) φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ,
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where
ξ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] = a
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− a′ − m˜D (λ, λ′) + C˜ [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]− J˜ (λ, λ′) ,
m˜D (λ, λ
′) ≡ r˜ (λ
′)− r˜ (λ)
κ1r˜ (λ)
mD,
C˜ [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)] ≡ κ2
κ1
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) ρ+ αρ
r˜ (λ) + α
− r˜ (λ
′) ρ′ + αρ
r˜ (λ′) + α
)
,
J˜ (λ, λ′) ≡ r˜ (λ
′)
κ1r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ)− 1
κ1
(r˜ (λ′)− r) J2 (λ′) .
Since this equality holds for any (ρ∗, a∗, λ∗), one can take derivative of the both sides with
respect to ρ∗ using Leibniz rule whenever necessary:
0 = −αf(ρ∗)
a∗∫
−∞
φρ∗,λ∗(a)da+ αf(ρ
∗)
1∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ
− f(ρ∗)
a∗∫
−∞
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
ξ[(ρ∗,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ∗,λ∗(a)da
+ f(ρ∗)
∞∫
a∗
M∫
0
1∫
−1
ξ[(ρ∗,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]∫
−∞
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ∗,λ∗(a)da.
After cancellations,
0 = −α
a∗∫
−∞
φρ∗,λ∗(a)da+ α
1∫
−1
a∗∫
−∞
φρ,λ∗(a)daf(ρ)dρ
−
a∗∫
−∞
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
ξ[(ρ∗,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ∗,λ∗(a)da
+
∞∫
a∗
M∫
0
1∫
−1
ξ[(ρ∗,a,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]∫
−∞
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ∗,λ∗(a)da.
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Similarly, take derivative with respect to a∗ using Leibniz rule whenever necessary:
0 = −αφρ∗,λ∗(a∗) + α
1∫
−1
φρ,λ∗(a
∗)f(ρ)dρ
−
a∗∫
−∞
−(1 + r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
) M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ∗, λ′)
φρ′,λ′(ξ [(ρ
∗, a∗, λ∗) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)])f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′]φρ∗,λ∗(a)da
−
a∗∫
−∞
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
ξ[(ρ∗,a∗,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ∗,λ∗(a∗)
+
∞∫
a∗
(1 + r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
) M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ∗, λ′)
φρ′,λ′(ξ [(ρ
∗, a∗, λ∗) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)])f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′]φρ∗,λ∗(a)da
−
M∫
0
1∫
−1
ξ[(ρ∗,a∗,λ∗),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]∫
−∞
m (λ∗, λ′)φρ′,λ′(a′)da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
φρ∗,λ∗(a∗).
After simplification, the lemma is derived.
With further simplification, Lemma 4 implies
(α +m (λ,Λ))φρ,λ (a) = α
1∫
−1
φρ′,λ (a) f(ρ
′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
φρ,λ (a
′)
φρ′,λ′
(
a
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− a′ + C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]
)
da′f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′,
where
C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)] ≡ −m˜D (λ, λ′) + C˜ [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]− J˜ (λ, λ′) .
Taking the Fourier transform of the steady-state condition above, the first equation of
Lemma 2 is proven. The second equation comes from the fact that φρ,λ (a) is a pdf. And, the
third equation is implied by market clearing. When I derive C˜ [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)], the proof will be
complete.
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The first derivative of the Fourier transform evaluated at z = 0 is
(α +m (λ,Λ)) φ̂′ρ,λ (0) = α
1∫
−1
φ̂′ρ′,λ (0) f(ρ
′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
φ̂′ρ,λ (0) f(ρ
′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) i2piC [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
φ̂′ρ′,λ′ (0) f(ρ
′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′.
Therefore, the first moments satisfy
(α +m (λ,Λ))Eφ [a | ρ, λ] = α
1∫
−1
Eφ [a | ρ′, λ] f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
Eφ [a | ρ, λ] f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
−
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
Eφ [a | ρ′, λ′] f(ρ′)dρ′ψ(λ′)dλ′,
(α +m (λ,Λ))Eφ [a | ρ, λ] = αEφ [a | λ] + Eφ [a | ρ, λ] 2
(
r +
1
2
m (λ,Λ)− r˜ (λ)
)
−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ, λ′)]
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
+
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
Eφ [a | λ′]ψ(λ′)dλ′,
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(α + 2 (r˜ (λ)− r))Eφ [a | ρ, λ] = αEφ [a | λ]
−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ, λ′)]
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
+
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
Eφ [a | λ′]ψ(λ′)dλ′,
where the second term is
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
=
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
1
κ1
[
−
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
− 1
)
κ0 + κ2
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) ρ+ αρ
r˜ (λ) + α
− ρ
)
− r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) + (r˜ (λ′)− r) J2 (λ′)
]
1
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
ψ(λ′)dλ′.
Take expectation over ρ, and substitute out C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)]:
(r˜ (λ)− r)Eφ [a | λ] = −
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
1
κ1
[
−
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
− 1
)
(κ0 − κ2ρ)
− r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) + (r˜ (λ′)− r) J2 (λ′)
]
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
+
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
Eφ [a | λ′]ψ(λ′)dλ′.
And note that the equation (B.7) also connects J2 (λ
′) and Eφ [a | λ′] as a result of optimality:
(r˜ (λ)− r) J2 (λ) = (κ0 − κ2ρ)
(
r + 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ)
− 1
)
+
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
1
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
(−κ1Eφ [a′ | λ′] + (r˜ (λ′)− r) J2 (λ′))ψ(λ′)dλ′.
After tedious algebra, the last two equations imply the following linear equalities:
J2 (λ) =
κ0
r
− κ1
r
Eφ [a | λ]− κ2
r
ρ, (B.8)
Eφ [a | λ] =
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′) (r˜ (λ
′)− r)Eφ [a | λ′]ψ(λ′)dλ′
[r˜ (λ)]2 − r2 − r 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
. (B.9)
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Thus, these equations combined with the market-clearing condition
M∫
0
Eφ [a | λ′]ψ(λ′)dλ′ = A
pin down Eφ [a | λ] and J2 (λ) for all λ ∈ [0,M ]. It is easy to verify that one solution is as
follows:
Eφ [a | λ] =A, (B.10a)
J2 (λ) =
κ0
r
− κ1
r
A− κ2
r
ρ. (B.10b)
To complete the proof of Theorem 1, I need to show that the functional equation (B.9)
does not admit another linearly independent solution. To prove this, define the mapping
K : Lp ([0,M ])→ Lp ([0,M ]) such that
Ks =

M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′) (r˜ (λ
′)− r) s (λ′)ψ(λ′)dλ′
[r˜ (λ)]2 − r2 − r 1
2
m (λ,Λ)

λ∈[0,M ]
,
where s = {s (λ)}λ∈[0,M ] and Lp ([0,M ]) is the space of the non-negative functions that are pth
power summable on [0,M ]. Theorem 2.11 of Krasnosel’ski˘ı (1964) states that a u0-positive
mapping on a reproducing cone cannot have two linearly independent non-zero fixed point (p.
78). Thus, I need to show that Lp ([0,M ]) constitutes a reproducing cone and that K is u0-
positive. Krasnosel’ski˘ı (1964) shows that Lp ([0,M ]) is a reproducing cone (p. 18). By the
definition of u0-positivity, K is u0-positive if there exists a non-zero element u0 ∈ Lp ([0,M ])
such that for an arbitrary non-zero s ∈ Lp ([0,M ]) there can be found bl, bu ∈ R++ and a natural
number n such that
blu0 ≤ Kns ≤ buu0.
Using the definition of K and Lemma 1, it can be easily verified that these inequalities are
satisfied for n = 1,
u0 =
{
m (λ,M)
[r˜ (λ)]2 − r2 − r 1
2
m (λ,Λ)
}
λ∈[0,M ]
,
bl =
1
2
1
m (M,M)
r
2r˜ (M)
M∫
0
(r˜ (λ′)− r) s (λ′)ψ(λ′)dλ′,
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and
bu =
1
2
r˜ (M)
2r
M∫
0
(r˜ (λ′)− r) s (λ′)ψ(λ′)dλ′.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. Using the unique solution (B.10a) and (B.10b),
J˜ (λ, λ′) = −r (r˜ (λ
′)− r˜ (λ))
κ1r˜ (λ)
(κ0
r
− κ2
r
ρ− κ1
r
A
)
,
which implies
C [(ρ, λ) , (ρ′, λ′)] = r˜ (λ′)
κ2
κ1
(
ρ− ρ
r˜ (λ) + α
− ρ
′ − ρ
r˜ (λ′) + α
)
−
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
− 1
)
A,
and the proof Lemma 2 is also complete.
Proposition 2 can be derived as a by-product of the steps in this proof. More precisely, (22)
is derived by substituting J2 (λ) into (B.6). Using the resulting formula for marginal valuation
and (B.5), Equations (B.3a) and (B.3b) imply (23) and (24), respectively.
Using the marginal valuation in Proposition 2, application of the method of undetermined
coefficients to (B.4) pins down all the coefficients in (B.1):
(r + α)M (λ) =
κ22
2κ1 (r˜ (λ) + α)
2 r˜ (λ) (r˜ (λ)− r) ,
(r + α)E (λ) = H (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
F (λ′) + 2G (λ′)A+H (λ′) ρ− F (λ)
4 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
ψ(λ′)dλ′,
rD (λ) = α
(
E (λ) ρ+M (λ) ρ2
)
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
{
− [F (λ
′) + 2G (λ′) a′ +H (λ′) ρ′ − F (λ)]2
8 (G (λ) +G (λ′))
}
Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′).
Therefore, the value function is available in closed form up to the function r˜ (λ). Lemma 1 shows
that the function r˜ (λ), which is non-negative and bounded, exists and is unique. Finally, it is
easy to verify that the value function I have constructed satisfies the transversality conditions
(A.4a) and (A.4b).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Existence and continuity. Restate Equation (19):
r˜ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′,
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where r˜ (λ) ≥ 0 for all λ ∈ [0,M ] from the concavity of the value function. The functional
equation, in turn, implies that r˜ (λ) ≥ r for all λ ∈ [0,M ]. First, let’s establish the existence
and uniqueness of the solution of this functional equation. Define k (λ) ≡ r˜ (λ) − r. Rewrite
(19):
k (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)ψ(λ′)dλ′ − r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
k (λ) + r
k (λ) + k (λ′) + 2r
ψ(λ′)dλ′.
Rearrangement yields an alternative representation of the functional equation:
k (λ) =
1
2
m (λ,Λ)− r
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) 1
k(λ)+k(λ′)+2rψ(λ
′)dλ′
1 +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) 1
k(λ)+k(λ′)+2rψ(λ
′)dλ′
.
Let C ([0,M ]) be a space of continuous functions f : [0,M ]→ R, with the sup norm. Let E
be the set of non-negative functions in C ([0,M ]). Define the mapping T : E → E such that
Tk =

1
2
m (λ,Λ)− r
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) 1
k(λ)+k(λ′)+2rψ(λ
′)dλ′
1 +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) 1
k(λ)+k(λ′)+2rψ(λ
′)dλ′

λ∈[0,M ]
,
where k = {k (λ)}λ∈[0,M ]. C ([0,M ]) with the usual sup norm constitutes a real Banach space,
which is weakly complete and has a weakly compact unit sphere. And, the subset E of C ([0,M ])
is a normal cone (see Guo, Cho, and Zhu, 2004, p. 30). Thus, the solution of the functional
equation is a non-zero fixed point of T on a normal cone. The Tikhonov fixed point theorem
implies that every monotone and weakly continuous mapping on a normal cone acting in a
weakly complete space with weakly compact unit sphere has at least one non-zero fixed point
(Theorem 4.1 (d) of Krasnosel’ski˘ı, 1964, p. 122-123). It is easy to verify the monotonicity
of T , i.e. kA, kB ∈ E and kA ≤ kB imply TkA ≤ TkB. Therefore, in order to establish the
existence of the solution of the functional equation, what remains to show is weak continuity of
T . Consider an arbitrary sequence (kn) with lim
n→∞
kn = k
0 ∈ D (T ) ⊆ E. Applying the Lebesgue
dominated convergence theorem, the definition of T implies lim
n→∞
Tkn = Tk
0 (Hutson, Pym, and
Cloud, 2005, p. 55). Hence, T is weakly continuous and the existence of the solution of the
functional equation is established.
Uniqueness. To show the uniqueness, I follow Theorem 6.3 of Krasnosel’ski˘ı (1964), which
states that every u0-concave and monotone mapping on a cone has at most one non-zero fixed
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point (p. 188). Therefore, it suffices to show that T is u0-concave. By the definition of u0-
concavity, T is u0-concave if there exists a non-zero element u0 ∈ E such that for an arbitrary
non-zero k ∈ E there exist bl, bu ∈ R++ such that
blu0 ≤ Tk ≤ buu0,
and if for every t0 ∈ (0, 1),
T (t0k) ≥ t0Tk,
with strict inequality for λs such that (Tk) (λ) 6= 0. The latter inequality follows directly from
the definition of mapping T . It can also be easily verified from the definition of T that the former
inequality is satisfied for u0 =
{
1
2
m (λ,Λ)
}
λ∈[0,M ], bl = (m (M,Λ) + 2r)
−1 (1 + 1
4r
m (M,Λ)
)−1
,
and bu = 1. Hence, the uniqueness of the solution of the functional equation is established as
well.
Monotonicity. The function r˜ (λ) is strictly increasing if r˜ (λ′) > r˜ (λ) for all λ ∈ [0,M ] and
for all λ′ ∈ [0,M ] with λ′ > λ. To obtain a contradiction, suppose there exist λ, λ′ ∈ [0,M ]
with λ′ > λ, and r˜ (λ′) ≤ r˜ (λ). Equation (19) implies that r˜ (λ′) and r˜ (λ) satisfy the following
equations respectively:
r˜ (λ′) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ′, λ′′)
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ′) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ(λ′′)dλ′′
r˜ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′′)
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ(λ′′)dλ′′.
As λ′ > λ and r˜ (λ′) ≤ r˜ (λ), the RHS of the second equation is lower than the RHS of the first
equation, which implies that r˜ (λ′) > r˜ (λ); and we obtain the desired contradiction. Hence,
the function r˜ (λ) is strictly increasing.
Concavity. To show the strict concavity of the function r˜ (λ), suppose λ0, λ1 ∈ [0,M ] and
λ2 = (1− δ)λ0 + δλ1 for δ ∈ (0, 1). I need to show
r˜ (λ2) > (1− δ) r˜ (λ0) + δr˜ (λ1) .
Equivalently,
1− δ
δ
>
r˜ (λ1)− r˜ (λ2)
r˜ (λ2)− r˜ (λ0) .
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Using (19), and using the facts that the function r˜ (λ) is strictly increasing and m (., .) is linear
in both of its arguments,
r˜ (λ1)− r˜ (λ2)
r˜ (λ2)− r˜ (λ0) =
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ1, λ
′) r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ1)+r˜(λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′ −
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ2, λ
′) r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ2)+r˜(λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ2, λ′)
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ2)+r˜(λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′ −
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ0, λ′)
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ0)+r˜(λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
<
M∫
0
1
2
[m (λ1, λ
′)−m (λ2, λ′)] r˜(λ′)r˜(λ2)+r˜(λ′)ψ(λ′)dλ′
M∫
0
1
2
[m (λ2, λ′)−m (λ0, λ′)] r˜(λ′)r˜(λ2)+r˜(λ′)ψ(λ′)dλ′
=
λ1 − λ2
λ2 − λ0 =
1− δ
δ
.
Hence, the function r˜ (λ) is strictly concave.
Differentiability. Assuming differentiability, (19) implies
r˜′ (λ) =
M∫
0
1
2
m1 (λ, λ
′) r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)ψ(λ
′)dλ′
1 +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) r˜(λ
′)
(r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′))2ψ(λ
′)dλ′
.
Since the RHS exists and is continuous, r˜ (λ) is continuously differentiable.
Aggregation. To derive the last property of the function r˜ (λ), take the expectation of Equa-
tion (19):
M∫
0
r˜ (λ)ψ(λ)dλ = r +
M∫
0
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)ψ(λ)dλ′dλ
= r +
1
2
M∫
0
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)ψ(λ)dλ′dλ
+
1
2
M∫
0
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)ψ(λ)dλ′dλ
= r +
1
2
M∫
0
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)ψ(λ)dλ′dλ
= r +
1
2
M∫
0
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)ψ(λ′)ψ(λ)dλ′dλ
= r +
m (Λ,Λ)
4
.
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B.3 Proof of Proposition 3
I first take the Fourier transform of the second and third lines of Equation (26):
∞∫
−∞
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
gρ,λ (θ
′)
gρ′,λ′
(
θ
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− θ′
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dρ′dλ′
]
e−i2piθzdθ
=
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
gρ,λ (θ
′)
 ∞∫
−∞
gρ′,λ′
(
θ
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− θ′
)
e−i2piθzdθ
 f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dρ′dλ′
=
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′) gρ,λ (θ′) e
−i2piz
1+
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ′
 ∞∫
−∞
gρ′,λ′
(
θ
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− θ′
)
e
−i2piz
1+
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
(
θ
(
1+
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
)
−θ′
)
d
(
θ
(
1 +
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)
− θ′
)]
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dρ′dλ′
=
M∫
0
1∫
−1
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′) gρ,λ (θ′) e
−i2piz
1+
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ′
ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dρ′dλ′
=
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
) ∞∫
−∞
gρ,λ (θ
′) e
−i2piz
1+
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ′
dθ′
 f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′
=
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
ĝρ,λ
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′.
Now I take the Fourier transform of the first term on the RHS of Equation (26):
∞∫
−∞
 1∫
−1
gρ′,λ (θ + (ρ
′ − ρ)C (λ)) f (ρ′) dρ′
 e−i2piθzdθ
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=1∫
−1
 ∞∫
−∞
gρ′,λ (θ + (ρ
′ − ρ)C (λ)) e−i2piθzdθ
 f (ρ′) dρ′
=
1∫
−1
ei2pi(ρ
′−ρ)C(λ)z
 ∞∫
−∞
gρ′,λ (θ + (ρ
′ − ρ)C (λ)) e−i2pi(θ+(ρ′−ρ)C(λ))zd (θ + (ρ′ − ρ)C (λ))
 f (ρ′) dρ′
=
1∫
−1
ei2pi(ρ
′−ρ)C(λ)zĝρ′,λ (z) f (ρ′) dρ′.
And using the linearity and integrability of the Fourier transform, Equation (29) is obtained.
To obtain equations (30) and (31), I use the identities satisfied by the Fourier transform
(see Bracewell, 2000, p. 152-154) for any function h(x)
ĥ(0) =
∞∫
−∞
h(x)dx
and
ĥ′(0) = −i2pi
∞∫
−∞
xh(x)dx
respectively.
n-th conditional moment of inventories can be written as follows using the Fourier transform:
Eg [θn | ρ, λ] = (−i2pi)−n
[
dn
dzn
ĝρ,λ(z)
]
z=0
.
Let’s first use the Fourier transform of θ distribution to find an expression for d
n
dzn
ĝρ,λ(z):
(α +m (λ,Λ))ĝρ,λ(z) = α
1∫
−1
e−i2pi(ρ−ρ
′)C(λ)zĝρ′,λ (z) f (ρ
′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) ĝρ,λ
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′,
(α +m (λ,Λ))
dn
dzn
ĝρ,λ(z) = α
1∫
−1
dn
dzn
(
e−i2pi(ρ−ρ
′)C(λ)zĝρ′,λ (z)
)
f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
dn
dzn
[
ĝρ,λ
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)]
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′.
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To proceed, I use the following generalization of the product rule:
dn
dxn
2∏
i=1
hi(x) =
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
) 2∏
i=1
dji
dxji
hi(x),
(α +m (λ,Λ))
dn
dzn
ĝρ,λ(z)
= α
1∫
−1
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
){[
dj1
dzj1
e−i2pi(ρ−ρ
′)C(λ)z
] [
dj2
dzj2
ĝρ′,λ (z)
]}
f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
){[
dj1
dzj1
ĝρ,λ
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)]
[
dj2
dzj2
ĝρ′,λ′
(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)]}
f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′,
(α +m (λ,Λ))
dn
dzn
ĝρ,λ(z)
= α
1∫
−1
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
){
(−i2pi (ρ− ρ′)C (λ))j1e−i2pi(ρ−ρ′)C(λ)zĝ(j2)ρ′,λ(z)
}
f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)nĝ
(j1)
ρ,λ (
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)
ĝ
(j2)
ρ′,λ′(
z
1 + r˜(λ
′)
r˜(λ)
)f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′,
(α +m (λ,Λ))
dn
dzn
ĝρ,λ(0)
= α
1∫
−1
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
){
(−i2pi (ρ− ρ′)C (λ))j1 ĝ(j2)ρ′,λ(0)
}
f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)nĝ
(j1)
ρ,λ (0)ĝ
(j2)
ρ′,λ′(0)f (ρ
′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′.
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Dividing both sides by (−i2pi)n:
(α +m (λ,Λ))Eg [θn | ρ, λ]
= α
1∫
−1
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
){
((ρ− ρ′)C (λ))j1Eg
[
θj2 | ρ′, λ]} f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) (1+
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
)n
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
)
Eg
[
θj1 | ρ, λ]Eg [θj2 | ρ′, λ′] f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′.
Using the binomial expansion of ((ρ− ρ′)C (λ))j1 :
(α +m (λ,Λ))Eg [θn | ρ, λ]
= α
1∫
−1
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
){
(C (λ))j1
j1∑
k=0
(
j1
k
)
(−ρ′)k(ρ)j1−kEg
[
θj2 | ρ′, λ]} f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) (
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
)
Eg
[
θj1 | ρ, λ]Eg [θj2 | ρ′, λ′] f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′,
(α +m (λ,Λ))Eg [θn | ρ, λ]
= α
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
)
(C (λ))j1
j1∑
k=0
(
j1
k
)
(ρ)j1−k
1∫
−1
(−ρ′)kEg
[
θj2 | ρ′, λ] f (ρ′) dρ′
+
∑
j1+j2=n
(
n
j1, j2
)
Eg
[
θj1 | ρ, λ]
M∫
0
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) (
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)nEg
[
θj2 | ρ′, λ′] f (ρ′)ψ (λ′) dρ′dλ′.
Applying the law of iterated expectations and rearranging, (32) is obtained.
What remains to show to complete the proof of the proposition is that all equilibrium mo-
ments exists and are unique. Existence and uniqueness of Eg [θ | λ] are established in the proof
of Theorem 1 because it is pinned down simultaneously by the optimality conditions and the
steady-state conditions. Given, Eg [θ | λ], Equation (32) generates Eg [θ | ρ, λ] uniquely. Indeed,
given Eg
[
θk | λ] for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} and given Eg [θk | ρ, λ] for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}, Equation
(32) generates Eg [θn | ρ, λ] uniquely; i.e., the recursive system characterizes the moments con-
ditional on (ρ, λ) by taking as given the moments conditional on λ. Then, the proof will be
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complete when we show that the system characterizes uniquely the moments conditional on λ,
too; i.e., given Eg
[
θk | λ] for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} and given Eg [θk | ρ, λ] for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1},
Equation (32) generates Eg [θn | λ] uniquely. Start by taking the expectation of both sides of
(32) over ρ and rearranging:m (λ,Λ)− M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
ψ (λ′) dλ′
Eg [θn | λ]
= α
n∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
(C (λ))j
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
ρj−kEg
[
(−ρ)kθn−j | λ]
+
n−1∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
Eg
[
θj | ρ, λ] M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
Eg
[
θn−j | λ′]ψ (λ′) dλ′
+
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
Eg [θn | λ′]ψ (λ′) dλ′.
This is the functional equation that generates Eg [θn | λ] by taking as given Eg
[
θk | λ] for
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1} and given Eg
[
θk | ρ, λ] for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n− 1}. It can be re-written as
f (λ)−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
)n
ψ (λ′)
m (λ,Λ)−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
f (λ′) dλ′
=
m (λ,Λ)− M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−1
{
α
n∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
(C (λ))j
j∑
k=0
(
j
k
)
ρj−kEg
[
(−ρ)kθn−j | λ]
+
n−1∑
j=1
(
n
j
)
Eg
[
θj | ρ, λ] M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
Eg
[
θn−j | λ′]ψ (λ′) dλ′
 .
From the continuity of r˜ (λ), this is an inhomogeneous Fredholm integral equation of the second
kind. The celebrated Fredholm Alternative Theorem states that this equation has exactly one
solution if the homogeneous version has only the zero solution (Hutson et al., 2005, p. 189).
The homogeneous version defines the monotone mapping
(Kf) (λ) =
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
)n
ψ (λ′)
m (λ,Λ)−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
f (λ′) dλ′.
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If this mapping K has only the trivial fixed point, the proof will be done. To obtain a contra-
diction, suppose there is a fixed point f 6= 0. By definition of absolute value,
f (λ) ≤ |f (λ) |
for all λ ∈ [0,M ]. Since K is a monotone mapping,
(Kf) (λ) ≤ (K|f |) (λ) .
Because f is a fixed point of K,
f (λ) ≤
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
)n
|f (λ′) |ψ (λ′) dλ′
m (λ,Λ)−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
.
Starting with −f (λ) ≤ |f (λ) | and following the same steps,
−f (λ) ≤
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
)n
|f (λ′) |ψ (λ′) dλ′
m (λ,Λ)−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
.
Thus,
|f (λ) | ≤
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′)
)n
|f (λ′) |ψ (λ′) dλ′
m (λ,Λ)−
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜(λ)
r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
.
Since this holds for all λs,m (λ,Λ)− M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)n
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
 |f (λ) |
≤
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)n
|f (λ′) |ψ (λ′) dλ′.
Taking the expectation of both sides with respect to λ and rearranging,
M∫
0
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
[
1− (r˜ (λ))
n + (r˜ (λ′))n
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))n
]
|f (λ′) |ψ (λ′)ψ (λ) dλ′dλ ≤ 0.
Since all integrands are positive, the inequality holds only if f = 0, which delivers the desired
contradiction.
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B.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Using Proposition 2,
GV (θ, λ) =
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′) |q [(θ, λ) , (θ′, λ′)]| gλ′ (θ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′
=
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
∣∣∣∣ r˜ (λ′) θ − r˜ (λ) θ′r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
∣∣∣∣ gλ′ (θ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)

r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ∫
−∞
r˜ (λ′) θ − r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
+
∞∫
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ
r˜ (λ) θ′ − r˜ (λ′) θ
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
ψ (λ
′) dλ′.
and
NV (θ, λ) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′) q [(θ, λ) , (θ′, λ′)] gλ′ (θ′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′) θ − r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′) θ
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′)ψ (λ′) dθ′dλ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′) θ
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= 2 (r˜ (λ)− r) |θ| .
Therefore,
IV (θ, λ) =
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)

r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ∫
−∞
r˜ (λ′) [θ − |θ|]− r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
+
∞∫
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ
r˜ (λ) θ′ − r˜ (λ′) [θ + |θ|]
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
ψ (λ
′) dλ′.
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To derive (i), one can take derivative with respect to θ applying the Leibniz rule whenever
necessary:
∂GV (θ, λ)
∂θ
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
[
2Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
)
− 1
]
ψ (λ′) dλ′,
∂NV (θ, λ)
∂θ
= 2 (r˜ (λ)− r) sgn θ,
∂IV (θ, λ)
∂θ
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
[
2Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
)
− 1− sgn θ
]
ψ (λ′) dλ′.
Since ρ is distributed symmetrically around 0, Equation (29) implies ĝλ (z) = ĝλ (−z), and
hence, θ is distributed symmetrically around 0, conditional on λ. Then,
∂GV (θ, λ)
∂θ

< 0 if θ < 0
= 0 if θ = 0
> 0 if θ > 0
and the gross volume is minimized at θ = 0. The behavior of the net volume is also the same.
However, the intermediation volume behaves oppositely:
∂IV (θ, λ)
∂θ

< 0 if θ > 0
= 0 if θ = 0
> 0 if θ < 0,
hence the gross volume is maximized at θ = 0.
To derive (ii), one takes derivative with respect to λ using Lemma 1 and applying the chain
rule and the Leibniz rule whenever necessary:
∂GV (θ, λ)
∂λ
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
{(
Eg
[
θ′|θ′ > r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
θ, λ′
]
+ θ
)(
1−Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
))
−
(
Eg
[
θ′|θ′ < r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
θ, λ′
]
+ θ
)
Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
)}
ψ (λ′) dλ′
]
r˜′ (λ)
+
M∫
0
∂m (λ, λ′)
∂λ

r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ∫
−∞
r˜ (λ′) θ − r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
+
∞∫
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ
r˜ (λ) θ′ − r˜ (λ′) θ
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
ψ (λ
′) dλ′,
∂NV (θ, λ)
∂λ
= 2r˜′ (λ) |θ| ,
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∂IV (θ, λ)
∂λ
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
{
−θ
(
2Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
)
− 1
)
+ |θ|
+Eg
[
θ′|θ′ > r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
θ, λ′
](
1−Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
))
−Eg
[
θ′|θ′ < r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
θ, λ′
](
Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
))}
ψ (λ′) dλ′
]
r˜′ (λ)
+
M∫
0
∂m (λ, λ′)
∂λ

r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ∫
−∞
r˜ (λ′) [θ − |θ|]− r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
+
∞∫
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ
r˜ (λ) θ′ − r˜ (λ′) [θ + |θ|]
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
gλ′ (θ
′) dθ′
ψ (λ
′) dλ′.
Using the symmetry of θ around 0 for all λs, Eg
[
θ′|θ′ > r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ, λ′
]
> 0 and Eg
[
θ′|θ′ < r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ, λ′
]
<
0. Therefore, the first term of ∂GV(θ,λ)
∂λ
is strictly positive. Since m (λ, λ′) is a linear increasing
function of λ, the second term is strictly positive as well, impliying ∂GV(θ,λ)
∂λ
> 0. ∂NV(θ,λ)
∂λ
≥ 0
(with equality if θ = 0) by the definition of absolute value. −θ
(
2Gλ′
(
r˜(λ′)
r˜(λ)
θ
)
− 1
)
+ |θ| ≥ 0 by
the definition of absolute value and the symmetry of θ around 0. The second line of ∂IV(θ,λ)
∂λ
is
strictly positive by the same argument that is used for the the first term of ∂GV(θ,λ)
∂λ
, implying
the first term of ∂IV(θ,λ)
∂λ
(sum of first two lines) is strictly positive. Since m (λ, λ′) is a linear
increasing function of λ, the second term is weakly positive, implying ∂IV(θ,λ)
∂λ
> 0.
Finally, to derive (iii), one takes derivative with respect to λ using Lemma 1 and applying
the chain rule and the Leibniz rule whenever necessary:
∂GVpm (θ, λ)
∂λ
= r˜′ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2{(
Eg
[
θ′|θ′ > r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
θ, λ′
]
+ θ
)(
1−Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
))
−
(
Eg
[
θ′|θ′ < r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ)
θ, λ′
]
+ θ
)
Gλ′
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ)
θ
)}
ψ (λ′) dλ′
]
,
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∂NVpm (θ, λ)
∂λ
=
2 |θ|
(m (λ,Λ))2
(
1 +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′) r˜(λ
′)
(r˜(λ)+r˜(λ′))2ψ(λ
′)dλ′
)
m (λ,Λ)
M∫
0
1
2
∂m (λ, λ′)
∂λ
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
− ∂m (λ,Λ)
∂λ
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
−∂m (λ,Λ)
∂λ
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
ψ(λ′)dλ′
 .
Strict positivity of ∂GV
pm(θ,λ)
∂λ
follows from the strict positivity of the first term of ∂GV(θ,λ)
∂λ
. Since
m (λ, λ′) = 2λλ
′
Λ
, then ∂NV
pm(θ,λ)
∂λ
≤ 0 (with equality if θ = 0). The strict positivity of ∂IVpm(θ,λ)
∂λ
follows from ∂GV
pm(θ,λ)
∂λ
> 0 and ∂NV
pm(θ,λ)
∂λ
≤ 0.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 7
Let us start by calculating E [θ + q|θ, λ]. Proposition 2 implies
E [θ + q|θ, λ] = θ + E [q|θ, λ] = θ + E
[−r˜ (λ′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
|θ, λ
]
= θ +
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
−r˜ (λ′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
G (dθ′, dλ′)
= θ +
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
−r˜ (λ′) θ + r˜ (λ)Eg [θ′|λ′]
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′
= θ − θ
m (λ,Λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′
= θ − 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
θ = θ
[
1− 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
]
,
where the last equality follows from the definition of r˜ (λ) in Theorem 1 and the previous one
follows from the fact that Eg [θ′|λ′] = 0 for λ′ ∈ [0,M ].
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Now, let us calculate var [θ + q|θ, λ].
var [θ + q|θ, λ] = E [(θ + q − E [θ + q|θ, λ])2 |θ, λ]
= E
[(
θ + q − θ
[
1− 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
])2
|θ, λ
]
= E
[(
q + θ
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
)2
|θ, λ
]
= E
[(−r˜ (λ′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
+ θ
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
)2
|θ, λ
]
= E
[(
θ
[
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
− r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
]
+
r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)2
|θ, λ
]
= E
[(
θ
[
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
− r˜ (λ
′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
])2
|θ, λ
]
+ E
[(
r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)2
|θ, λ
]
= θ2var
[
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
| λ
]
+
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
varg [θ | λ′]
(
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)2
ψ (λ′) dλ′,
where the last equality follows from the definition of r˜ (λ) in Theorem 1 and the previous one
follows from the fact that Eg [θ′|λ′] = 0 for λ′ ∈ [0,M ].
The definition of r˜ (λ) in Theorem 1 implies
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′ ∈ (0, 1) ,
because r˜ (λ) ≥ r and
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
m (λ,Λ)
ψ(λ′)dλ′ = 1.
Calculate the derivative of this:
d
dλ
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
=
2r˜′ (λ)m (λ,Λ)− 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)m1 (λ,Λ)
(m (λ,Λ))2
< 0,
which follows by taking the derivative of (19) and using the fact that r˜′ (λ) > 0.
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Lastly, the definition of r˜ (λ) in Theorem 1 implies
var
[
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
| λ
]
=
M∫
0
λ′
Λ
(
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
)2
ψ(λ′)dλ′ −
(
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
)2
∈ (0, 1) ,
because both terms on the RHS are between 0 and 1 and the first term is larger. Calculate the
derivative of this:
d
dλ
var
[
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
| λ
]
= −2r˜′ (λ)
M∫
0
λ′
Λ
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
r˜ (λ′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′−8 (r˜ (λ)− r) r˜
′ (λ)
(m (λ,Λ))2
+
8 ((r˜ (λ)− r))2
(m (λ,Λ))2 λ
=
4r˜′ (λ)
m (λ,Λ)
− 4 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)λ
− 2r˜′ (λ)
M∫
0
λ′
Λ
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′
− 8 (r˜ (λ)− r) r˜
′ (λ)
(m (λ,Λ))2
+
8 ((r˜ (λ)− r))2
(m (λ,Λ))2 λ
=
4
m (λ,Λ)
[
1− 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
] [
r˜′ (λ)− r˜ (λ)− r
λ
]
− 2r˜′ (λ)
M∫
0
λ′
Λ
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′)
ψ(λ′)dλ′ < 0,
where the second equality follows from
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)λ
− 2r˜
′ (λ)
m (λ,Λ)
= r˜′ (λ)
M∫
0
λ′
Λ
r˜ (λ′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′))2
ψ(λ′)dλ′,
which follows by taking the derivative of (19).
B.6 Proof of Proposition 8
Rewrite the numerator of markup:
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
[
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ′′)
+ 3
]
varg [θ
′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ +  (λ) ,
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where  (λ) collects the terms that do not contain varg [θ
′′|λ′′]. Take derivative w.r.t. λ:
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
mλ (λ, λ
′′) 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)−m (λ, λ′′) 2r˜′ (λ)
[2 (r˜ (λ)− r)]2
[r˜ (λ)]2 + 3r˜ (λ′′) r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
1
r˜ (λ′′)
var [θ′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r) r˜
′ (λ) r˜ (λ′′)
3r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))3
1
r˜ (λ′′)
var [θ′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ + ′ (λ)
=
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
[r˜ (λ)]2 + 3r˜ (λ′′) r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
1
λ
1
r˜ (λ′′)
var [θ′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
[r˜ (λ)]2 + 3r˜ (λ′′) r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)− r
1
r˜ (λ′′)
var [θ′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
r˜ (λ) r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜′ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
1
r˜ (λ′′)
var [θ′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r) r˜
′ (λ) r˜ (λ′′)
3r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))3
1
r˜ (λ′′)
var [θ′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ + ′ (λ) .
Using the fact that
r˜′ (λ)
1 + M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
 = r˜ (λ)− r
λ
, (B.11)
one can show that the sum of the terms before ′ (λ) is positive. It is easy to verify that the
denominator of markup is an increasing function of λ, and hence, it will contribute negatively
to the derivative of markup. Also, the sign of ′ (λ) can be negative or positive. However, it
is certain that the terms with varg [θ
′′|λ′′] contribute positively to the derivative of markup.
Thus, from continuity, varg [θ
′′|λ′′]s must be large enough for the total derivative to be positive,
which completes the part (ii) of the proposition.
To show the part (i), rewrite the numerator of markup:
κ1θ
4r˜ (λ′)
+
1
2
κ1θ
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ + ε (λ) ,
where ε (λ) represents the terms with integral of varg [θ
′′|λ′′].
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Take the derivative w.r.t. λ:
−1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
[r˜ (λ)]2
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
1
2
κ1θ
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
mλ (λ, λ
′′) 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)−m (λ, λ′′) 2r˜′ (λ)
[2 (r˜ (λ)− r)]2
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−1
2
κ1θ
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)2
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)
r˜ (λ′′) r˜′ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ + ε′ (λ)
= −1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
1
r˜ (λ)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
1
2
κ1θ
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′) 2 (r˜ (λ)− r)−m (λ, λ′′)λ2r˜′ (λ)
[2 (r˜ (λ)− r)]2 λ
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
2
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ + ε′ (λ)
=
1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
1
λr˜′ (λ)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
1
r˜ (λ)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
2
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
−1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
1
r˜ (λ)− rψ (λ
′′) dλ′′ + ε′ (λ)
=
1
2
κ1θr˜
′ (λ)
r˜ (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
(
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)2
[
1
λr˜′ (λ)
− 1
r˜ (λ)
− 2
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
− 1
r˜ (λ)− r
]
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′ + ε′ (λ) .
Again, using (B.11) and that the lower bound of the distribution of λs is 1/8, one can
show that the first term of the derivative is negative. Since ε′ (λ) is positive, from continuity,
varg [θ
′′|λ′′]s must be small enough for the total derivative to be negative. It is easy to verify
95
that the denominator of markup is an increasing function of λ. Thus, the derivative of the
markup is negative when varg [θ
′′|λ′′]s are small enough.
B.7 Proof of Proposition 9
Using τ1 (λ) specified in the proposition, (47) becomes:
r˜ (λ) = r +
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
κ1
r˜∗(λ) +
κ1
r˜∗(λ)
r˜∗(λ)−r
r˜∗(λ)+r
κ1
r˜∗(λ) +
κ1
r˜∗(λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′,
where r˜∗ (λ) is the solution of the corresponding functional equation (41) for the planner. Using
(41), one notices that
r˜ (λ) =
[r˜∗ (λ)]2 + r2
r˜∗ (λ) + r
⇔ r˜∗ (λ) =
r˜ (λ) +
√
[r˜ (λ)]2 + 4r (r˜ (λ)− r)
2
.
After noticing this and using τ1 (λ) and τ2 (λ) specified in the proposition, it follows from (42),
(43), (45), and (46) that
q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] = q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]
and
θ∗ (ρ, a, λ) = θ (ρ, a, λ) ,
which establishes that the specified tax scheme decentralizes the constrained efficient allocation.
Now define and calculate, τ (λ), the instantaneous average financial transaction tax collected
from investors with speed type λ:
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
(
τ1 (λ)
2
{
2aq∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + (q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)])2
}
+τ2 (λ) (ρ− ρ) q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]) Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da) ≡ τ (λ) .
The integrand has three terms: The first two are related to τ1 (λ) and the last one is related
to τ2 (λ). Let us calculate these terms one by one. The first term is:
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∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
τ1 (λ)
2
2aq∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
= τ1 (λ)
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) a
−r˜∗ (λ′) θ∗ (ρ, a, λ) + r˜∗ (λ) θ∗ (ρ′, a′, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
= −τ1 (λ)
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
aθ∗ (ρ, a, λ) Φλ (dρ, da)ψ (λ′) dλ′
= −τ1 (λ)
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
[θ∗ (ρ, a, λ)− C∗ (λ) (ρ− ρ)] θ∗ (ρ, a, λ)
Φλ (dρ, da)ψ (λ
′) dλ′
= −τ1 (λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
[θ∗ (ρ, a, λ)− C∗ (λ) (ρ− ρ)] θ∗ (ρ, a, λ) Φλ (dρ, da)
= −τ1 (λ) (r˜∗ (λ)− r) {var [θ∗|λ]− C∗ (λ) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ]} .
The second term is:
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
τ1 (λ)
2
(q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)])2 Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
=
τ1 (λ)
2
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
(−r˜∗ (λ′) θ∗ (ρ, a, λ) + r˜∗ (λ) θ∗ (ρ′, a′, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
=
τ1 (λ)
2
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
[(−r˜∗ (λ′) θ∗ (ρ, a, λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2
+
(
r˜∗ (λ) θ∗ (ρ′, a′, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2]
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
=
τ1 (λ)
2
var [θ∗|λ] M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2
ψ (λ′) dλ′
+
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2
var [θ∗|λ′]ψ (λ′) dλ′
 .
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By taking the derivative of (44) twice and evaluating it at z = 0 in the same fashion as the
proof of Proposition 3, I obtainm (λ,Λ)− M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2
ψ (λ′) dλ′
 var [θ∗|λ]
= 2C∗ (λ) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ] +
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
(
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
)2
var [θ∗|λ′]ψ (λ′) dλ′.
Substituting this into the previous expression, the second term of τ (λ) becomes
τ1 (λ)
2
m (λ,Λ) var [θ∗|λ] + var [θ∗|λ] M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
[r˜∗ (λ′)]2 − [r˜∗ (λ)]2
[r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)]2
ψ (λ′) dλ′
−2 (r˜∗ (λ)− r)C∗ (λ) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ]]
=
τ1 (λ)
2
m (λ,Λ) var [θ∗|λ] + var [θ∗|λ] M∫
0
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)− r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′
−2 (r˜∗ (λ)− r)C∗ (λ) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ]]
=
τ1 (λ)
2
[m (λ,Λ) var [θ∗|λ]−m (λ,Λ) var [θ∗|λ] + 2 (r˜∗ (λ)− r) var [θ∗|λ]
−2 (r˜∗ (λ)− r)C∗ (λ) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ]]
= τ1 (λ) [(r˜
∗ (λ)− r) var [θ∗|λ]− (r˜∗ (λ)− r)C∗ (λ) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ]] .
Now one sees that the first and second terms of τ (λ) cancel each other out. Thus, only the last
term will contribute. The last term is:
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) τ2 (λ) (ρ− ρ) q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
= τ2 (λ)
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) (ρ− ρ) −r˜
∗ (λ′) θ∗ (ρ, a, λ) + r˜∗ (λ) θ∗ (ρ′, a′, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φλ (dρ, da)
= −τ2 (λ)
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
(ρ− ρ) θ∗ (ρ, a, λ) Φλ (dρ, da)ψ (λ′) dλ′
= −τ2 (λ)
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
r˜∗ (λ′)
r˜∗ (λ) + r˜∗ (λ′)
ψ (λ′) dλ′cov [ρ, θ∗|λ]
= −τ2 (λ) (r˜∗ (λ)− r) cov [ρ, θ∗|λ] .
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Again, taking the derivative of (44) and evaluating it at z = 0 in the same fashion as the proof
of Proposition 3 leads to:
cov [ρ, θ∗|λ] = α
α + r˜∗ (λ)− r
κ2
κ1
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + α
var [ρ] .
Hence,
τ (λ) = −τ2 (λ) α (r˜
∗ (λ)− r)
α + r˜∗ (λ)− r
κ2
κ1
r˜∗ (λ)
r˜∗ (λ) + α
var [ρ] .
After using τ2 (λ) defined in the proposition, the derivation of τ (λ) is complete.
B.8 Proof of Proposition 10
(55) implies
a1−ij =
1
λi
a0i +
λi − 1
λi
[
A− qij + κ2
κ1
(ρ− ρi)
]
(B.12)
and
a1−ji =
1
λj
a0j +
λj − 1
λj
[
A+ qij +
κ2
κ1
(ρ− ρj)
]
. (B.13)
Substituting these to (53a) and rearranging,
qij =
−a0i−A
λi
− κ2
κ1
ρi−ρ
λi
+
a0j−A
λj
+ κ2
κ1
ρj−ρ
λj
1
λi
+ 1
λj
, (B.14)
which is equal to (57).
Substituting (B.12), (B.13), and (B.14) to (53b) and rearranging,
Pij = κ0 − κ1
a0i + (λi − 1)A+ κ2κ1 (ρi + (λi − 1) ρ) + a0j + (λj − 1)A+ κ2κ1 (ρj + (λj − 1) ρ)
λi + λj
= κ0 − κ1A− κ2ρ− κ1
a0i − A+ κ2κ1 (ρi − ρ) + a0j − A+ κ2κ1 (ρj − ρ)
λi + λj
,
which is equal to (58).
Appendix C. Calculation of intermediation markups
First, calculate the transaction price for the initial trade at which the investor with 0 inventory
and speed type λ provides intermediation to a counterparty with speed type λ′ by buying θ
units of the asset from him. According to Equation (20) this price must be
P = Jθ (θ, λ) +
κ1θ
4
(
1
r˜ (λ)
− 1
r˜ (λ′)
)
.
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Using the marginal valuation formula from Proposition 2,
P =
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1 θ
r˜ (λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P ihr
+
κ1
4
(
1
r˜ (λ)
− 1
r˜ (λ′)
)
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
P sp
=
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1θ
4
(
3
r˜ (λ)
+
1
r˜ (λ′)
)
, (C.1)
where P ihr is the post-trade marginal valuation and P sp is the speed premium.
Now, calculate the expected price the investor will receive while trying to unload this in-
ventory of θ:
E [Pq|θ, λ]
E [q|θ, λ] .
Let us start by calculating E [q|θ, λ]. Proposition 2 implies
E [q|θ, λ] = E
[−r˜ (λ′′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
|θ, λ
]
=
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
m (λ, λ′′)
m (λ,Λ)
−r˜ (λ′′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
Φ (dθ′′, dλ′′)
=
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
m (λ,Λ)
−r˜ (λ′′) θ + r˜ (λ)Eg [θ′′|λ′′]
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
= − θ
m (λ,Λ)
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
= −2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
m (λ,Λ)
θ, (C.2)
where the last equality follows from the definition of r˜ (λ) in Theorem 1 and the previous one
follows from the fact that Eg [θ′′|λ′′] = 0 for λ′′ ∈ [0,M ].
Now, let us calculate E [Pq|θ, λ]. E [Pq|θ, λ] will have a component due to post-trade
marginal valuation and another component due to speed premium. Call these, respectively,
Eihr [Pq|θ, λ] and Esp [Pq|θ, λ]. First, note from Proposition 2 that the transaction price
P [(θ, λ) , (θ′′, λ′′)] can be written as
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1 θ + θ
′′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
post-trade marg. val.
+
κ1
4
r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
(
− θ
r˜ (λ)
+
θ′′
r˜ (λ′′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
speed premium
.
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Thus,
Eihr [Pq|θ, λ] = E
[−r˜ (λ′′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
(
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1 θ + θ
′′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
)
|θ, λ
]
= E
[−r˜ (λ′′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
u2 (ρ,A)
r
+ κ1θ
2 r˜ (λ
′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
− κ1 (θ′′)2 r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
|θ, λ
]
= E [q|θ, λ] u2 (ρ,A)
r
+ κ1θ
2
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
− κ1
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
Eg
[
(θ′′)2 |λ′′
]
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′,
where the last equality follows from (C.2) and the previous equality follows from the fact that
Eg [θ′′|λ′′] = 0 for λ′′ ∈ [0,M ]. Similarly,
Esp [Pq|θ, λ] = E
[−r˜ (λ′′) θ + r˜ (λ) θ′′
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
{
κ1
4
r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
(
− θ
r˜ (λ)
+
θ′′
r˜ (λ′′)
)}
|θ, λ
]
= E
[
κ1θ
2
4
r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ)
+
κ1 (θ
′′)2
4
r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ′′)
|θ, λ
]
=
κ1θ
2
4
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
κ1
4
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
m (λ,Λ)
r˜ (λ′′)− r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ′′)
Eg
[
(θ′′)2 |λ′′
]
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′.
Then, the expected price the investor will receive by unloading the inventory of θ becomes:
E [Pq|θ, λ]
E [q|θ, λ] =
Eihr [Pq|θ, λ]
E [q|θ, λ] +
Esp [Pq|θ, λ]
E [q|θ, λ] , (C.3)
where
Eihr [Pq|θ, λ]
E [q|θ, λ] =
u2 (ρ,A)
r
− κ1θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
κ1
θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
r˜ (λ)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
varg [θ
′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
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and
Esp [Pq|θ, λ]
E [q|θ, λ] =
κ1θ
4
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
r˜ (λ)− r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′
+
κ1
4θ
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
2 (r˜ (λ)− r)
r˜ (λ)− r˜ (λ′′)
(r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′))2
r˜ (λ)
r˜ (λ′′)
varg [θ
′′|λ′′]ψ (λ′′) dλ′′.
Define the markup as
µ (θ, λ, λ′) ≡
E[Pq|θ,λ]
E[q|θ,λ] − P
P
=
Eihr[Pq|θ,λ]
E[q|θ,λ] − P ihr
P︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡µihr(θ,λ,λ′)
+
Esp[Pq|θ,λ]
E[q|θ,λ] − P sp
P︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡µsp(θ,λ,λ′)
.
Using (C.1), (C.3), and the fact that
2 (r˜ (λ)− r) =
M∫
0
m (λ, λ′′)
r˜ (λ′′)
r˜ (λ) + r˜ (λ′′)
ψ (λ′′) dλ′′,
one obtains (38).
Using the same equation and the fact that r˜ (λ) ≥ r for all λ ∈ [0,M ], one can also show
that the markup (38) is positive when the normalizing price (C.1) and θ are positive.
Appendix D. Planner’s problem
In this appendix, I write down the current-value Hamiltonian of the planner’s problem described
in Subsection 5.1. Then, using it, I derive the ODEs for the co-state variables in an optimum.
Since ρ, a, and λ are continuous variables, we have a continuum of control variables (and of
dynamic restrictions and co-state variables, too), corresponding to the continuum of investor
characteristics. van Imhoff (1982) describes a heuristic method of solving such problems. This
method relies on interpreting the integral (39) as a summation of discrete variables over intervals
with widths dρ, da, and dλ. An application of Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem32
guarantees the convergence of this summation to the integral (39) as the widths of intervals
approach 0.
Keeping in mind van Imhoff (1982)’s interpretation, the planner’s current-value Hamiltonian
32See, for a reference, Hutson et al. (2005, p. 55).
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can be written as
L (q|Φ) =
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
u (ρ, a) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+ α
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
(ϑ (ρ′, a, λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)) f (ρ′) dρ′Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {ϑ (ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] {q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + q [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ) ,
where φ induces the cdf Φ; ϑ denotes the current-value co-state variable associated with φ; and
ζ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the condition (40).
First-order conditions. Take any optimal q∗ and let
ϑ∗ (ρ, a, λ) = ϑ (ρ, a+ q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ) , (D.1)
and let
qˆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] = q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + εI{ϑ∗(ρ,a,λ)>ϑ∗(ρ′,a′,λ′)} − εI{ϑ∗(ρ,a,λ)<ϑ∗(ρ′,a′,λ′)}
= q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + ε∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] .
For small ε, I obtain up to second-order terms:
L (qˆ|Φ)− L (q∗|Φ)
= ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)ϑ∗2 (ρ, a, λ) ∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)] Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+ ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] {∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + ∆ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
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=
ε
2
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)ϑ∗2 (ρ, a, λ) ∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ
′, a′, λ′)] Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+
ε
2
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)ϑ∗2 (ρ
′, a′, λ′) ∆ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)] Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] {∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + ∆ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
=
ε
2
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {ϑ∗2 (ρ, a, λ)− ϑ∗2 (ρ′, a′, λ′)}∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] {∆ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + ∆ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
If q∗ is optimal, this must be negative. The second term is 0 by construction. Since the
integrand in the first term is positive, it must be zero everywhere. Recalling (40) and (D.1),
thus, the FOC becomes
ϑ2 (ρ, a+ q
∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ) = ϑ2 (ρ′, a′ − q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ′) . (D.2)
ODE for co-state variables In an optimum, the co-state variables must satisfy the ODEs,
∇n(ρ,a,λ)L (q∗|Φ) = rϑ (ρ, a, λ)−
.
ϑ (ρ, a, λ) , (D.3)
where n (ρ, a, λ) is the degenerate measure which puts all the probability on the type (ρ, a, λ)
and ∇n denotes the Gaˆteaux differential in the direction of measure n:
∇nL (q∗|Φ) = lim
ε→0
L (q∗|Φ + εn)− L (q∗|Φ)
ε
.
For small ε, I obtain up to second-order terms:
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L (q∗|Φ + εn)− L (q∗|Φ) = ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
u (ρ, a)n (dρ, da, dλ)
+ εα
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
(ϑ (ρ′, a, λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)) f (ρ′) dρ′n (dρ, da, dλ)
+ ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {ϑ (ρ, a+ q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′)n (dρ, da, dλ)
+ ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {ϑ (ρ, a+ q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)}
n (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ)
+ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] {q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + q∗ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′)n (dρ, da, dλ)
+ε
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] {q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + q∗ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
n (dρ′, da′, dλ′) Φ (dρ, da, dλ) .
Thus,
∇n(ρ,a,λ)L (q∗|Φ) = u (ρ, a) + α
1∫
−1
(ϑ (ρ′, a, λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)) f (ρ′) dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′) {ϑ (ρ, a+ q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− ϑ (ρ, a, λ)
+ϑ (ρ′, a′ + q∗ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)] , λ′)− ϑ (ρ′, a′, λ′)}Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′)
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
{ζ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + ζ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}
{q∗ [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] + q∗ [(ρ′, a′, λ′) , (ρ, a, λ)]}Φ (dρ′, da′, dλ′) .
Using (40), (D.3), and the FOC (D.2), the ODE for the co-state variables in Subsection 5.1
obtains.
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Appendix E. Micro-foundations for the quadratic utility
flow
Assume that there are two assets. One asset is riskless and pays interest at an exogenously
given rate r. This asset is traded in a continuous frictionless market. The other asset is risky,
traded over the counter, and is in supply denoted by A. This asset pays a cumulative dividend:
dDt = mDdt+ σDdBt,
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion.
I borrow the specification of preferences and trading motives from Duffie et al. (2007) and
Gaˆrleanu (2009). Investors are subjective expected utility maximizers with CARA felicity
functions. Investors’ coefficient of absolute risk aversion and time preference rate are denoted
by γ and r respectively.
Investor i has cumulative income process ηi:
dηit = mηdt+ σηdB
i
t,
where
dBit = ρ
i
tdBt +
√
1− (ρit)2dZit .
The standard Brownian motion Zit is independent of Bt, and ρ
i
t captures the instantaneous
correlation between the payoff of the risky asset and the income of investor i. This correlation
is time-varying and heterogeneous across investors. Thus, this heterogeneity creates the gains
from trade. In the context of different markets, this heterogeneity can be interpreted in different
ways such as hedging demands or liquidity needs. In the case of a credit derivatives market,
for example, the correlation captures the exposure to credit risk. If a bank’s exposure to the
credit risk of a certain bond or loan is high, the correlation between the bank’s income and the
payoff of the derivative written on that specific bond or loan will be negative, implying that the
derivative provides hedging to the bank. Therefore, that bank will have a high valuation for
the derivative. Another bank with a short position in the bond will have a positive correlation
and, consequently, a low valuation for the derivative.
I assume that the correlation between an investor’s income and the payoff of risky asset
is itself stochastic. Stochastic processes that govern idiosyncratic shocks and trade are as
described in Section 2.
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Let V (W, ρ, a, λ) be the maximum attainable continuation utility of investor of type (ρ, a, λ)
with current wealth W . It satisfies
V (W, ρ, a, λ) = sup
c
Et
−∞∫
t
e−r(s−t)e−γcsds | Wt = W , ρt = ρ, at = a
 ,
s.t.
dWt = (rWt − ct)dt+ at−dDt + dηt − P [(ρt−, at−, λ) , (ρ′t, a′t, λ′t)] dat
dat =
{
q [(ρt−, at−, λ) , (ρ′t, a
′
t, λ
′
t)] if there is contact with investor (ρ
′
t, a
′
t, λ
′
t)
0 if no contact,
where
{q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]} =
arg max
q,P
[V (W−qP, ρ, a+q, λ)−V (W, ρ, a, λ)] 12 [V (W ′+qP, ρ′, a′−q, λ′)−V (W ′, ρ′, a′, λ′)] 12 ,
s.t.
V (W − qP, ρ, a+ q, λ) ≥ V (W, ρ, a, λ), (E.1)
V (W ′ + qP, ρ′, a′ − q, λ′) ≥ V (W ′, ρ′, a′, λ′).
Since investors have CARA preferences, terms of trade are independent of wealth levels as I
will show later. To eliminate Ponzi-like schemes, I impose the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
e−r(T−t)Et
[
e−rγWT
]
= 0.
To derive the optimal rules, the technique of stochastic dynamic programming is used.
Assuming sufficient differentiability and applying Ito’s lemma for jump-diffusion processes, the
investor’s value function V (W, ρ, a, λ) satisfies the HJB equation
0 = sup
c
{−e−γc + VW (W, ρ, a, λ)[rW − c+ amD +mη]
+
1
2
VWW (W, ρ, a, λ)[σ
2
η + 2ρaσDση + a
2σ2D]
− rV (W, ρ, a, λ) + α
1∫
−1
[V (W, ρ′, a, λ)− V (W, ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
{V (W − q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)
−V (W, ρ, a, λ)}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′)}. (E.2)
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Following Duffie et al. (2007), I guess that V (W, ρ, a, λ) takes the form
V (W, ρ, a) = −e−rγ(W+J(ρ,a,λ)+J)
for some function J(ρ, a), where
J =
1
r
(
mη +
log r
γ
− 1
2
rγσ2η
)
is a constant. Replacing into (E.2), I find that the optimal consumption is
c = − log r
γ
+ r(W + J(ρ, a, λ) + J).
After plugging c back into (E.2) and dividing by rγV (W, ρ, a, λ), I find that (E.2) is satisfied
iff
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = amD − 1
2
rγ
(
a2σ2D + 2ρaσDση
)
+ α
1∫
−1
1− e−rγ[J(ρ′,a,λ)−J(ρ,a,λ)]
rγ
f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1− e−rγ{J(ρ,a+q[(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)],λ)−J(ρ,a,λ)−q[(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]P [(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)]}
rγ
m (λ, λ′) Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′). (E.3)
Terms of individual trades, q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] and P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)], are determined
by a Nash bargaining game with the solution given by the optimization problem (E.1). Dividing
by V (W, ρ, a, λ)
1
2V (W ′, ρ′, a′, λ′)
1
2 , (E.1) can be written as
{q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)]}
= arg max
q,P
[1− e−rγ[J(ρ,a+q,λ)−J(ρ,a,λ)−qP ]] 12 [1− e−rγ[J(ρ′,a′−q,λ′)−J(ρ′,a′,λ′)+qP ]] 12 ,
s.t.
1− e−rγ[J(ρ,a+q,λ)−J(ρ,a,λ)−qP ] ≥ 0
1− e−rγ[J(ρ′,a′−q,λ′)−J(ρ′,a′,λ′)+qP ] ≥ 0.
As can be seen, terms of trade are independent of wealth levels. Solving this problem is
relatively straightforward: I set up the Lagrangian of this problem. Then using the first-order
and Kuhn-Tucker conditions, the trade size q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] solves Equation (12). And, the
transaction price P [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] is given by Equation (14) if J2(ρ, a, λ) 6= J2(ρ′, a′, λ′);
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and P = J2(ρ, a, λ) if J2(ρ, a, λ) = J2(ρ
′, a′, λ′). Substituting the transaction price into (E.3), I
get
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = amD − 1
2
rγ
(
a2σ2D + 2ρaσDση
)
+ α
1∫
−1
1− e−rγ[J(ρ′,a,λ)−J(ρ,a,λ′)]
rγ
f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1− e− rγ2 {J(ρ,a+q[(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)],λ)−J(ρ,a,λ)+J(ρ′,a′−q[(ρ,a,λ),(ρ′,a′,λ′)],λ′)−J(ρ′,a′,λ′)}
rγ
m (λ, λ′) Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′), (E.4)
subject to (12).
Equation (E.4) cannot be solved in closed form. Consequently, following Gaˆrleanu (2009),
I use the linearization 1−e
−rγx
rγ
≈ x that ignores terms of order higher than 1 in [J(ρ′, a, λ) −
J(ρ, a, λ)]. The same approximation is also used by Biais (1993), Duffie et al. (2007), Vayanos
and Weill (2008), and Praz (2014). Economic meaning of this approximation is that I assume
investors are risk averse towards diffusion risks while they are risk neutral towards jump risks.
The assumption does not suppress the impact of risk aversion as investors’ preferences feature
the fundamental risk-return trade-off associated with asset holdings. It only linearizes the
preferences of investors over jumps in the continuation values created by trade or idiosyncratic
shocks. The approximation yields the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Fix parameters γ, σD and ση, and let σD = σD
√
γ/γ and ση = ση
√
γ/γ. In any
stationary equilibrium, investors’ value functions solve the following HJB equation in the limit
as γ goes to zero:
rJ(ρ, a, λ) = amD − 1
2
rγ
(
a2σ2D + 2ρaσDση
)
+ α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′) {J(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)− J(ρ, a, λ)
+J(ρ′, a′ − q [(ρ, a, λ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′)}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′),
subject to (12).
Setting κ0 ≡ mD, κ1 ≡ rγσ2D, and κ2 ≡ rγσDση, the problem is equivalent to the one with
the reduced-form quadratic utility flow.
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Appendix F. The corporate bond market
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) was launched by the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD) in 2002, by publicly reporting the transactions of approximately
five hundred corporate bond issues of large and good credit entities at the beginning. The
coverage expanded steadily over a few years, and by February 2005 it began disseminating 99%
of all transactions in eligible corporate debt securities. I use enhanced TRACE database in this
analysis, which includes trades that were not originally captured by standard TRACE database.
I use the data filters proposed by Dick-Nielsen (2014) in cleaning enhanced TRACE data. This
procedure eliminates potentially erroneous entries, reversals as well as canceled, corrected, and
commissioned trades.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of trade sizes
This figure presents the distribution of corporate bond transactions across rating groups over different time
periods. The sample includes all bond transactions obtained from TRACE. “q” represents the par value vol-
ume of the reported transaction. “2014,” “2012–2014,” and “2005–2014” indicate the three subsamples which
distributions of trade sizes are presented. “A and above,” “Investment grade,” and “All bonds” show the trade
size distributions of bonds with A and above credit rating, investment grade bonds, and all bonds, respectively.
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Table 1
Distribution of trade sizes
This table presents descriptive statistics for par value volume of transactions in the corporate bond market
for the sample period from 2005 to 2014. “Sample” column specifies the subsample which statistics are based
on. “P1,” “P10,” “P50,” “P90,” and “P99” show the 1st, 10th, 50th, 90th, and 99th percentile observation of
the distribution, respectively. “Norm. SD” (normalized standard deviation) is the ratio of sample standard
deviation to sample mean.
Sample Observations P1 P10 P50 P90 P99 Mean St. dev. Norm. SD
2014
A and above 2,978,826 1,000 5,000 31,000 1,220,000 10,000,000 631,407 2,824,662 4.47
Investment grade 5,534,167 1,000 5,000 30,000 1,167,000 10,000,000 592,808 2,467,386 4.16
All bonds 8,940,678 1,000 5,000 43,000 1,410,000 10,000,000 599,189 2,523,175 4.21
2012–2014
A and above 9,871,794 1,000 5,000 29,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 570,536 2,646,328 4.64
Investment grade 18,323,485 1,000 5,000 28,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 525,109 2,293,448 4.37
All bonds 28,122,637 1,000 5,000 35,000 1,065,000 8,675,000 535,532 2,365,792 4.42
2005–2014
A and above 32,939,497 1,000 5,000 25,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 548,791 3,233,151 5.89
Investment grade 51,898,709 1,000 5,000 25,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 550,319 2,949,527 5.36
All bonds 75,245,578 1,000 5,000 25,175 1,325,000 10,000,000 586,985 3,462,783 5.90
Appendix G. Two-dimensional ex ante heterogeneity
In this appendix, I consider a generalization of the baseline OTC model to two-dimensional ex
ante heterogeneity: speed type, λ, and risk aversion parameter, γ, where the quadratic utility
function (1) is augmented with this γ parameter:
u(ρ, a, γ) ≡ κ0a− 1
2
γκ1a
2 − γκ2ρa.
Let ψ (λ, γ) denote the joint pdf of speed types and risk aversion levels on [0,M ]× [γmin, γmax].
Speed types and risk aversion levels are allowed to be correlated but they are distributed
independently from the hedging need types and from all the stochastic processes in the model.
Differently from the baseline model, I assume A = 0 and ρ = 0. In the baseline model without
risk aversion heterogeneity, the result Eφ [a | λ] = A obtains for an arbitrary positive A and
an arbitrary ρ. In this extended version, investors with low risk aversion levels want to have
higher exposure to the aggregate endowment of risk, A+ κ2
κ1
ρ. Thus, the result Eφ [a | λ, γ] = A
and the resulting simplifications afforded by the quadratic utility obtain only when A = 0 and
ρ = 0 in the extended model.
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The investors’ generalized problem (the counterpart of Equation (15)) can be written as
rJ(ρ, a, λ, γ) = u (ρ, a, γ) + α
1∫
−1
[J(ρ′, a, λ, γ)− J(ρ, a, λ, γ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
γmax∫
γmin
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
m (λ, λ′)
1
2
[
max
q
{J(ρ, a+ q, λ, γ)− J(ρ, a, λ, γ)
+J(ρ′, a′ − q, λ′, γ′)− J(ρ′, a′, λ′, γ′)}] Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′, dγ′).
To find the marginal valuation, I differentiate this equation with respect to a, applying the
envelope theorem:
rJ2(ρ, a, λ, γ) = u2 (ρ, a, γ) + α
1∫
−1
[J2(ρ
′, a, λ, γ)− J2(ρ, a, λ, γ)]f(ρ′)dρ′
+
γmax∫
γmin
M∫
0
∞∫
−∞
1∫
−1
1
2
m (λ, λ′) {J2(ρ, a+ q [(ρ, a, λ, γ) , (ρ′, a′, λ′)] , λ)
−J2(ρ, a, λ, γ)}Φ(dρ′, da′, dλ′, γ′),
where
u2(ρ, a, γ) = κ0 − γκ1a− γκ2ρ.
Following the exact same steps in the proof of Theorem 1 and Proposition 2, the equilibrium
marginal valuation is
J2(ρ, a, λ, γ) =
κ0
r
− γκ1
r˜ (λ, γ)
θ(ρ, a, λ, γ),
where
θ(ρ, a, λ, γ) = a+
κ2
κ1
r˜ (λ, γ)
r˜ (λ, γ) + α
ρ
and r˜ (λ, γ) solves the following generalized version of the functional equation (19):
r˜ (λ, γ) = r +
γmax∫
γmin
M∫
0
1
2
m (λ, λ′)
γ
r˜(λ,γ)
γ
r˜(λ,γ)
+ γ
′
r˜(λ′,γ′)
ψ(λ′, γ′)dλ′dγ′. (G.1)
Here, the endogenous degree of inventory aversion of an investor is given by γκ1
r˜(λ,γ)
. In the
baseline model without heterogeneity in risk aversion, λ was the only source of heterogeneity
in investors’ inventory aversion. Now, λ and γ jointly determine the inventory aversion.
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Solving (G.1) numerically reveals that the inventory aversion is an increasing function of risk
aversion and a decreasing function of speed type. Thus, Figure 3 shows that upward-sloping
iso-inventory-aversion curves arise on the plane of risk aversion and trading speed because risk
aversion and trading speed have opposite impact on the inventory aversion of an investor.
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Fig. 3. Inventory aversion as a function of λ and γ, when r = 0.05, κ1 = 100, m (λ, λ
′) =
2λλ
′
Λ , λ ∼ U [5, 10], γ ∼ U [2, 5], and λ and γ are independently distributed.
This generalization implies that if investors differ in their exogenous risk aversion levels as
well as speed types, the main intermediaries are those with “low risk aversion and high speed
type.” Because these investors have the lowest endogenous inventory aversion, they have the
comparative advantage in providing liquidity to others. As a result, investor centrality increases
in the northwest direction of Figure 3.
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